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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to investigate the planning abilities of nonhumans, specifically rats. 
This was assessed by the animals‟ tendency to behave in response to future rather than present 
motivations.  For the purposes of this study the future motivation in question was anticipatory 
sensory specific satiety, i.e., the animals were trained to expect satiating exposure to a certain 
flavour of rat pellet in the near future.  At the testing phase of the study the animals were offered 
an unexpected choice of two flavours prior to being exposed to the excess of the experimental 
flavour.  This unexpected flavour choice consisted of the flavour that the animal was about to 
receive (the flavour congruous with the animal‟s expectation), and an alternative flavour, of 
equal familiarity and palatability (the incongruous flavour).  The consumption of the congruous 
and incongruous flavours was recorded.  When faced with this choice, an animal successfully 
anticipating satiation to the upcoming flavour would be expected to consume proportionally 
more of the alternative (incongruous) flavour, in order to maintain the pleasantness of the 
anticipated flavour.  However the results were inconclusive: there was no significant difference 
between the proportion of the congruous and the incongruous flavours consumed, suggesting that 
the current group of animals was not capable of spontaneously anticipating the upcoming 
flavour.  An altered procedure then investigated whether the animals were capable of learning to 
anticipate the upcoming flavour by introducing regular (and therefore expected) flavour choices.  
Under these new circumstances the animals consumed significantly higher proportions of the 
congruous compared to the incongruous flavour.  Taken together, these results suggest both that 
the animals were unable to spontaneously anticipate being satiated by an upcoming flavour, and 
were unable to learn to anticipate this satiation following repeated trials.  The results and certain 
assumptions of the study are discussed. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The Original Mental Time Travel (Memory based) 
 
Mental Time Travel (MTT) (Suddendorf & Busby, 1997) was originally used to describe the ability of 
humans to ‘travel’ cognitively back in time to recall specific past experiences.  It was this process that 
enabled episodic memory (Tulving, 1984), which could be considered a re-living of specific past 
experiences (episodes).  This is distinct from semantic memory, which is memory for ‘general 
knowledge’.  For example, knowing Paris is the capital of France is a semantic memory, but 
remembering the specific occasion on which you learnt that fact – who told you, where you were, etc, 
would be an episodic memory and would have required a conscious ‘travelling back’ along one’s own 
personal timeline.  It is this kind of specific, vivid memory for past events that is unavailable to amnesic 
patients, and a gradual loss of this episodic ability is one characteristic of Alzheimer’s disease (McKhann, 
Drachman, Folstein, Katzman, Price & Stadlan, 1984; Collie & Maruff, 2000).  Consequently, there is 
much literature on human and nonhuman research on episodic and episodic-like memory, particularly 
surrounding the benefits of nonhuman research in this area to further understanding of 
neurodegenerative disease (Aggleton & Pearce, 2001; Morris, 2001; Hampton & Schwartz, 2004). 
 
 
Mental Time Travel Encompassing the Future 
 
Recent findings have provided an extra angle for such research however.  The disorders mentioned 
above appear to show a deficit not only in memory (the ability to travel mentally ‘back in time’) but also 
in the ability to consider equally specific and vivid future occasions (travelling ‘forward in time’).  The 
cognitive decline of a person with Alzheimer’s disease, for example, is marked by a simultaneous loss of 
the ability to either recall past episodes or to carry out the kind of forward-thinking that is necessary for 
managing finances or planning a meal etc, with these and similar activities becoming increasingly 
difficult (McKhann et al, 1984; Collie et al, 2000; Nedjam, Barba & Pillon, 2000). 
 
Tulving (1984) considered this ability to plan for the future to be the main purpose behind humans’ 
episodic memory ability.  Although ‘mental time travel’ was coined after Tulving’s ‘episodic memory’, 
Tulving considered that the kind of vivid, personal memory that he had tapped into could sensibly be 
thought of as the retrospective wing of an over-arching mental time travel system.  In fact he considered 
the ability to ‘relive’ specific personal episodes to be a mere by-product of a system that was designed 
essentially to allow vivid projection into the future.  He reasoned that mental time travel is cognitively 
demanding.  It is necessary to generate an infinite number of possible future situations, evaluate the 
likelihood of each one, then put current needs on hold while action is taken to prepare for multiple 
future time points, all the while balancing these actions without compromising the wellbeing of the 
current self (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Suddendorf & Busby 2005).  This complex ability would only 
have been favoured by natural selection if it considerably increased our chances of survival.  This means 
specifically being able to plan for an uncertain future, not to vividly relive the past.  Of course it is 
important to have the ability to recall a dangerous past episode, for example, though its value only 
comes with the ability to take steps to prevent a similar occasion in the future.  If this is the case further 
research would not be confined to the area of memory but could encompass the ability to ‘looking 
forwards’ - the ability to plan for the future. 
 
 
Evidence for a Single ‘Dual Direction’ MTT System in Humans 
 
Recent functional MRI studies on healthy participants have demonstrated that thinking about 
past and future episodes evoke very similar patterns of neural activity, and in the same brain 
structures, which Botzung, Denkova & Manning (2008) consider provides evidence that the 
ability to envisage the past and future place are rooted in common cognitive resource.  Patient 
studies too have investigated this: When considering amnesic patients for instance it does not 
come as a surprise that they are unable to recall past experiences, however recent research has 
demonstrated that these people are equally impaired when it comes to casting the mind forward – 
that is, amnesic patients are as unable to envisage specific future situations as past occurrences: 
Patient DB (Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002) for example was asked to envisage himself 
carrying out activities that coming evening that would make him a good parent (he was in fact a 
parent).  While he was able to name suitable generic activities „make dinner, read a story‟ etc, he 
was not able to imagine himself personally carrying out any such tasks in the future, and hence 
could not provide any additional detail or make any preparations for carrying them out (picking 
up an extra loaf of bread on the way home, for example).  DB „knew‟ what parents were 
supposed to do; he just could not imagine personally doing it (Klein et al, 2002).  Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann & Maguire (2007) found similar results.  As retrospective and prospective 
thinking appear to fail simultaneously after certain kinds of brain damage, it suggests that there is 
a „mental time travel system‟ that encompasses both the retrospective and prospective elements 
of an individual‟s personal timeline. 
 
These patient studies also demonstrate that ‘future thinking’ can be split into general semantic abilities 
and more specific episodic abilities just as memory can, suggesting once more that these abilities are 
connected.  The patient described above had his semantic cognitions intact: he was able to give general 
‘scripts’ of sensible future activities, just as many amnesic patients remain able to semantically recall a 
great deal of general knowledge.  The impairment relates to recalling or envisaging anything specific and 
personal to themselves. 
 
Further evidence for an MTT system encompassing both memory and future thought is provided by 
several developmental studies.  In terms of language ability, children begin to use ‘past terms’ 
(yesterday, used to, before) and ‘future terms’ (tomorrow, if I get thirsty, we might) at around the same 
time (generally between 3-4 years old), suggesting a simultaneous grasping of the concept of their own 
personal past and future (Hudson, Shapiro & Sosa, 1995).   
 
If these abilities do develop in tandem it would be expected that a child capable of reliably recalling 
specific memories (something already established) would also have the ability to express plans for 
specific future occasions.  Suddendorf & Busby (2005) investigated both retro- and prospective abilities.  
Three, four and five year old children were asked what they did yesterday and what they wanted to do 
tomorrow. The study found that a third of the three year olds, half of the four year olds and three 
quarters of the five year olds were successful in providing both a memory and a suggestion of a future 
activity that was sufficiently specific and personal.  The similar retrospective and prospective figures for 
each age range suggest again that these abilities appear together. 
 
Further evidence of young children’s episodic versus semantic planning abilities comes from Atance & 
O’Neil’s (2005) ‘trip task.’  Children of three, four and five were told they were going on a trip and asked 
to choose from a selection of items to take with them, explaining their choices.  The older children 
appeared to choose items based on an envisaged future that was uncertain, using words like ‘maybe’ ‘if 
I get thirsty’ ‘just in case…’ selecting items that they did not need at present but might need in a future 
situation, such as plasters, a bottle of water or an umbrella.  Younger children gave answers more 
rooted in the present, such as choosing a book “to read” or a bottle of water “to drink” – similar to 
patient DB above, these children are able to call up a general mental ‘script’ of ‘things that happen on a 
trip’ (semantic type thinking), yet cannot invent a specific future scenario in which one item might be 
more useful than another – they cannot place themselves in the future (requiring episodic-like 
processes). 
 
Hudson, Shapiro and Sosa (1995) also discriminated between semantic and episodic future-orientated 
abilities.  Three, four and five year olds were asked to describe both generic plans (e.g., what happens 
when you go shopping?) as well as specific plans for their personal future (what will tom’s party be like 
tomorrow?).  The more generic questions required semantic knowledge of event ‘scripts,’ whereas the 
more specific required a genuine ability to think forward to a specific future occasion personal to them.  
While the former did not vary substantially across age groups (three year olds could call to mind general 
shopping based activities nearly as comprehensively as the five year olds), the latter ability to genuinely 
‘think forwards’ improved significantly with increasing age with the three year olds only rarely being 
successful, demonstrating a dissociation between these two kinds of future thinking, similar to the 
distinction between episodic and semantic memory. 
 
These tasks rely heavily on verbal ability however, so tasks with a greater behavioural component 
should also be utilised in order to prevent confounding cognitive and linguistic abilities.   Suddendorf 
and Busby’s (2005) behavioural Room Task is one such planning paradigm that can be adjusted for 
nonhuman as well as human participants, though only humans were considered in the Suddendorf et 
al’s experiment.  It assesses the ability to behave in response to future anticipated needs rather than 
presently experienced needs.  Three and four year old children were moved from a waiting room into a 
play room, and offered the opportunity to select a toy to accompany them into the latter room. In the 
playroom the children found a puzzle board missing its pieces.  At test, one of the toy options offered to 
the child was the puzzle pieces.  The same pattern of age-related abilities emerged for this task as those 
aforementioned: more four year olds were able to ‘look ahead’ sufficiently vividly to choose the puzzle 
pieces more often than any of the other items, which allowed these children to play in the otherwise 
empty playroom.  The three-year-olds did not choose this ‘correct’ toy any more often than any other 
object, showing that these younger children were not able to think ahead in the same way. 
 
The above studies suggest that between the ages of three and four comes an awareness of one’s 
personal future.  The four year olds were able to envisage future boredom in an almost empty playroom 
and successfully selected the toy that would help prevent it.  The three year olds had not yet developed 
the ability to consider future requirements that may be at odds with their current feelings (that they just 
liked the look of a different toy instead). 
 
This is an important methodology as it is entirely behavioural.  The behaviour shown allows an individual 
to balance present and future needs so that both the present and future self can be compromised as 
little as possible (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005).  The ‘consciousness’ aspect of the ability is clear in 
humans because humans can talk about the process of thinking backwards and forwards and recognise 
that they are envisioning themselves at different points in time (Tulving 2001).  However it has been 
argued that the expression of this self-awareness (the ability to report it through language) could be 
considered of secondary importance to the physical expression of behaviour that is based on anticipated 
rather than presently experienced motivations (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  It is this ability for future 
orientated behaviour that is presumably beneficial for mental time travelling individuals, not the ability 
to be conscious of doing it. 
 
Suddendorf et al’s (2005) aforementioned behavioural paradigm gives the same age-related results as 
other experiments that require mental time travel, which means this ability for future-orientated action 
can be taken as a behavioural marker of mental time travel abilities.  It may be possible then that 
nonhumans are able to demonstrate this ability through behaviour. 
 
 
 
Are MTT Abilities Uniquely Human? 
 
If consciousness is not taken as a requirement, the possibility of behaviourally-expressed nonhuman 
mental time travel would suggest human and nonhuman cognition in this area was less disparate than 
originally thought.  The creation of an animal model of mental time travel based on future-orientated 
action would allow increasingly detailed research on the neural pathways and mechanisms involved, 
greater understanding of which can only aid the development of surgical, drug, therapeutic or 
preventative treatments for human deficits in this area. 
Those that consider mental time travel uniquely human are those that focus on self-consciousness as a 
necessity for action related to the past or future, for example Tulving (1984) considered that episodic 
memory was closely linked to self consciousness, stipulating that one had to be aware of re-living a 
personal past experience, which led him to suggest the ability to mentally time travel in either direction 
was exclusively human.  In the absence of any striking evidence to the contrary reviewers generally 
agreed that this ability could in fact be regarded as such.  Indeed following experiments in the 1970s, 
Bischoff-Kohler (cited in Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) stated that nonhuman animals were in fact stuck 
in time and had no concept of a personal future or past independent of the drive states they were 
currently experiencing.  Osvath and Gärdenfors (2005) saw particularly future planning (dubbed 
‘anticipatory cognition’) as uniquely human and as evolving simultaneously with early human tool 
cultures and the need to transport animal carcasses over long distances and periods of time.  In these 
circumstances the ability to mentally represent a distant future was a huge advantage (particularly if 
group members were capable of representing a future common to all). 
 
Evidence for Nonhuman Retrospective MTT (episodic memory) 
Despite the above emphasis on self-consciousness, numerous studies have put forward behavioural 
results considered consistent with episodic memory abilities in nonhumans - or episodic-like, to account 
for the absence of any agreed non-verbal markers of consciousness – (Clayton, Bussey & Dickinson, 
2003; Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2003; Zentall, 2005; Schwartz, Hoffman & Evans, 2005). 
Clayton & Dickinson (1998) put forward certain criteria for nonhuman behaviour that was deemed to 
show genuine episodic like ability: Any study must demonstrate that an animal is behaving in response 
to genuine recall of a complete, unique past experience (the ‘what’. ‘where’ and ‘when’ of an episode) 
rather than acting on familiarity or learned semantic knowledge, that an animal can do so flexibly (i.e., 
can respond to changing test conditions), and can respond ‘on the spot’ to an unexpected test, rather 
than becoming familiar with the testing sequence which may result in them storing behavioural 
responses in advance and hence using semantic in place of episodic memory. 
Clayton et al’s (1998) scrub jays were able to demonstrate memory for what kind of food was cached 
where, and when.  The birds could also respond flexibly when certain kinds of foods (what), or foods 
cached in a specific place (where) or at a specific time (when) were degraded by the experimenter, by 
seeking out those foods that were still good to eat.   A study by Babb & Crystal (2005) utilised a similar 
task and demonstrated that rats were also capable of recalling what food was stored where after either 
a long or a short period of time (when).  Eacott and Norman’s (2004) episodic memory task for rats 
introduced the idea of ‘what, where and which’, to replace ‘what, where when’ considering that ‘when’ 
and ‘in which environmental context’ (e.g., black or white, with differing textures) were simply 
alternative ways of differentiating past experiences.  The rats were able to remember what sort of 
object had been placed where in which open-field context.  To ensure the animals were not responding 
to simple familiarity in the open field the procedure was adjusted (Eacott, Easton & Zinkivskay, 2005) by 
replacing this open environment with E-shaped mazes (of the same contexts as before, e.g., black and 
white with differing textures), such that the animals could not initially see round the corners to the 
objects and had to recall where (left or right) in which maze (black or white) held what object (novel or 
familiar).  This the rats did successfully, demonstrating an integrated memory for what object, where, 
and in which maze context.  Eichenbaum and Fortin (2003) also tested rats, demonstrating that the 
animals were able to recall the order in which odours had been previously experienced.  Zentall’s (2005) 
pigeons were able to report on their own previous behaviour (whether they had pecked at a stimulus or 
not) when asked to do so unexpectedly, though Schwartz, Hoffman & Evans (2005) argued that the 
intervals between the pigeons pecking (or not) and the unexpected test were too short to confirm that 
long-term episodic memory had been utilised.  The same Schwartz et al (2005) attempted to show 
episodic abilities in King the gorilla, though the authors admit that due to the large number of similar 
trials King may have started to expect his tests and store event information semantically rather than 
episodically.  His answers then would not have be based on genuine recall of a past event, but instead 
his ‘knowing’ which answer was right because he had purposefully committed it to memory previously, 
ready to relay it for a reward when asked.  The study of Panzee the chimp (Menzel, 1999) had a similar 
problem: it was possible that her ability to inform her keepers where experimenters had hidden her 
food 16 hours earlier was based on her committing the information to semantic memory as she watched 
them hide it, rather than genuinely recalling the actual hiding episode when asked 16 hours later. 
Despite the mixed results it is clear that at least some species and methodologies appear to show a 
positive result regarding behavioural indications of nonhuman episodic memory – Clayton et al’s (1998) 
jays and Eacott et al’s (2005) rats in the E-shaped maze.  This would suggest that behavioural indications 
of nonhuman future planning should also be possible.  If it could be established that nonhumans could 
behave in response to anticipation of a future event, with the displayed behaviour having no obvious 
link to the animal’s current needs, a future-orientated ability in nonhumans could be considered a 
possibility. 
 
Evidence for Nonhuman Prospective MTT (future planning) 
It is important to note that several studies have shown an impressive nonhuman ability to plan for the 
future, but based on current rather than anticipated future needs, which does not demonstrate a 
genuine future orientated ability.  Julia the chimp (Doel, 1970; cited by Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) is 
such an example.  She was able to plan a complex order in which she should open a series of boxes, 
containing keys that opened yet more boxes, to ultimately receive a food reward.  The authors suggest 
she is ‘future planning’ however Julia’s behaviour does not necessarily suggest this ability because she 
was hungry and awaiting her reward while she was completing her task.  Similarly Mulcahy & Call (2006) 
taught apes to use a tool that would remove grapes from a specially designed apparatus.  The authors 
demonstrated that the apes could select an appropriate tool (when given a choice between tools that 
would work and tools that would not) and carry it with them (while they were taken into a waiting room 
and then back into the testing room) in order to use it.  In some conditions there was an interval of 24 
hours between tool choice and tool use which would suggest that these apes had cognitive access to at 
least 24 hours worth of future experience.  Again, however, the apes selected their tool while in the 
same room as the apparatus on which it was to be used therefore they could still have been acting on a 
present rather than future desire to fish grapes from a box. 
 
It should also be noted that many species do engage in effective anticipatory behaviour such as storing 
food for the winter (Suddendorf et al, 1997).  This kind of behaviour does appear to suggest planning 
based on future rather than current needs.  Crucially however they are not future needs that are pre-
experienced - young animals preparing for their first winter will store food that they do not currently 
need, though this will not be the result of mentally pre-experiencing the cold and food scarcity, they 
merely behave automatically along with every other member of the species, regardless of previous 
experience.  Instinctive behaviour such as this is certainly future-directed, though by its very nature is 
inflexible and ‘mindless’, and must be so in order to guarantee survival.  
However some studies do claim to show genuine nonhuman future-orientated cognition.  Emery and 
Clayton (2001) suggest that scrub jays will deliberately re-cache food pellets if it is likely they will be 
stolen in the future.  They compared the behaviour of the birds while they either cached in private or 
when watched by another jay (in the wild these birds will pilfer the food stores of others if given the 
chance and the same behaviour can be produced in the lab).  It was thought that if birds were storing 
food with the future intention of retrieving it again, rather than just caching compulsively through 
instinct, they may alter their behaviour if they thought food they were presently caching might be at risk 
from future pilfering, and this was the case:  Birds that were watched while they cached were more 
likely to re-cache their stores in alternative locations if given the chance.  Several other manipulations 
make the results yet more interesting; the tendency to re-cache after being watched was only seen in 
birds that had previously pilfered another bird’s store – i.e., they appeared to require the experience of 
thieving in order to take steps to prevent their own food being stolen.  This demonstrates that while the 
ability to learn to re-cache is probably inbuilt, the actual behaviour only occurs after specific learning 
experiences.  While it cannot be established whether the birds actually envisage a personal future in 
which they are disappointed to find their caches stolen, it is nevertheless a behavioural demonstration 
that they are capable of acting on an anticipation based on previous experience (Emery et al, 2001). 
It could be argued however that the birds are still acting on current rather than anticipated future 
needs: it is likely to be at the time of their observed caching that they will register a feeling of ‘these are 
not safe’ (a general feeling of insecurity or unease).  When they are then presented with the ‘unsafe’ 
tray again a few hours later the ‘unsafe’ feeling associated with this tray could initiate an instinctive 
drive to re-cache.  This would not require conscious forward thinking, rather just a feeling of ‘knowing’ 
that things should not remain as they are.  Observational evidence from wild birds might be more 
compelling.  If a wild bird cached a supply of food and then voluntarily returned to the same site a short 
while later to re-cache because there had been other birds around at the time of the first caching, this 
would demonstrate something other than a familiar feeling of unease when re-presented with a tray.  A 
wild bird that behaves as above would be putting current drives (foraging for yet more food, lining a 
nest, etc) on hold while it essentially ‘re-does’ a previous job in order to protect future needs.  It remains 
that Emery et al’s (2001) jays change their behaviour based on previous experience and current 
circumstance (not all thieves automatically re-cache, it is only after being watched) to avert future 
disappointment, though it could still be considered contentious whether the birds are acting on needs 
that they are not currently experiencing. 
As aforementioned, Zentall (2001) demonstrated that pigeons can report on their previous behaviour 
(peck or not) when unexpectedly asked to do so, suggesting a purposeful mental backtracking, or 
episodic memory.  He also considers whether pigeons, and hence perhaps other nonhuman animals, can 
form ‘anticipatory traces’ as well as the retrospective ‘memory traces’ that allowed them to report on 
their previous behaviour. 
The distinction is illustrated by a discrimination task in which one of two initial stimuli informs which of 2 
subsequent stimuli is ‘correct’ and hence reinforced.  Zentall’s example uses shapes that cue colours – 
an initial triangle stimulus means that ‘red’ is the correct answer, while a circle denotes ‘green’ will be 
rewarded.  The question Zentall poses is, if there is a delay imposed between the shape stimulus and the 
colour choice, what method does the pigeon use to maintain the information in order to later receive a 
reward? Is it the case that the animal remembers the triangle until the red/green choice appears? Or 
does it immediately convert the triangle on seeing it to the answer ‘red’ and maintain this ‘anticipatory’ 
information until it is presented with the colour choice?  Zentall investigated this question by 
considering the kinds of stimuli that make this task easier for the animals: colour cues appear to be 
processed more readily than diagrams of lines in various orientations, for example.  Zentall found that 
performance increased when the initial cue was ‘easy’ to process, but did not alter when the end-
point/choice stimuli was easy instead.  Therefore the pigeons must be remembering the initial stimulus 
during the delay as it the ‘easiness’ of this stimulus that determines the performance gradient, hence 
the animals are not using future thinking here. 
In further studies however Zentall (2005) demonstrated that pigeons could be encouraged to encode 
prospectively if experimental manipulations meant it became more efficient to do so, for instance if 
many initial stimuli corresponded to only two ‘choice’ stimuli it presumably becomes a better strategy to 
encode one of two ‘answers’ immediately than to try to maintain one of many ‘questions’ during a delay 
interval.  Zentall sees this ability to code retro- and prospectively as an indication that nonhuman 
animals are not in fact stuck in time as the Bischoff-Kohler hypothesis states they are. 
However, it must be considered that Zentall’s pigeons were expecting rewards throughout the 
experiment (i.e., currently), and the delay timeframes were such that their behaviour may have been 
guided by working memory rather than a longer term and hence more stable retrospective or 
prospective trace.  It is the ability to behave in anticipation of a future that is more than a few seconds 
distant that is a useful survival tool.  It is an important finding that an animal normally coding 
retrospectively can be encouraged to do otherwise, though longer timeframes would be more 
compelling. 
 
One study that is particularly compelling is a recent effort by Correia, Dickinson & Clayton (2007) based 
on sensory specific satiety.  This is the phenomenon by which extensive consumption of a particular 
flavour renders that flavour subsequently less pleasant compared to alternatives (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 
1981).  Correia et al’s (2007) scrub jays were offered a choice of two foodstuffs to cache (A and B), and a 
short while later the birds were allowed to retrieve what they had cached.  However prior to the caching 
stage, the birds were provided with extensive amounts of one of the two foodstuffs (e.g., A) to consume 
to satiety, and immediately prior to the retrieval stage the birds were provided with extensive amounts 
of the other flavour (B), to consume to satiety.  Therefore if the birds were capable of anticipating the 
flavour that would be presented immediately prior to retrieval (B), they should cache the flavour that 
will be most pleasant to retrieve under those circumstances, i.e., flavour A.  However, this would mean 
caching the flavour by which they had just been satiated, which should go against the birds’ current 
drives of responding to sensory specific satiety.  However the birds did choose to cache the food that 
went against these current drives, and in doing so demonstrate an ability to behave in a way that is 
orientated towards the future.   Crucially also, this methodology was not repeated more than once.  This 
means that the birds responded to a ‘one-off’ occasion, and therefore were not relying on the 
consequences of repeated previous occasions to guide their behaviour.  This suggests a genuine ability 
to consider future needs above present ones. 
 
A study that similarly attempts to demonstrate nonhumans choosing a course of action that appears 
counterproductive to their current motivations is Naqshbandi & Roberts (2006):  Monkeys switched 
their preference from a larger to a smaller pile of food when the choice of this smaller pile resulted in a 
water bottle being returned to the cage sooner.  Crucially, the animals were not thirsty when they were 
making their large/small food choice, so they had not merely learnt to associate a physically smaller pile 
of food with the return of a desired object because at the time of choice this object was not desired.  It 
appears that these animals could foresee a thirst that they were not presently experiencing, and with 
sufficient salience that their previous and intuitive preference for a larger pile of food was reversed.  
However the procedure was repeated several times, which introduces the possibility that the monkeys 
were learning from the consequences of their actions.  They gradually shifted their behaviour from 
choosing a larger to choosing a smaller pile of food after learning that this resulted in a more agreeable 
and less thirsty future.  This behaviour does not therefore fulfil the necessary unexpected and ‘on the 
spot’ decision which Griffiths, Dickinson & Clayton (1999) assert is necessary for genuine episodic-like 
memory, and as such genuine episodic-like future planning.  It is still of note however that these 
monkeys were capable of learning to plan for the future.  This is particularly interesting because the 
study utilised exactly the same procedure with rats, yet regardless of the number of repetitions or how 
subsequently thirsty the rats became, they did not switch their preference to the smaller food pile, and 
thus did not demonstrate they were capable of learning to anticipate a future occasion. 
 
Other studies with rats have come to the same conclusion.  McKenzie, Bird & Roberts (2005) used a 
radial maze with 8 arms in which rats were trained to store small morsels of either cheese or pretzels.  
After a delay the rats were allowed back into the apparatus to find and eat the food that they had 
stored, exactly where they had left it.  In one experimental condition, the food stored in the arms on 
one side of the apparatus were consistently made inedible by the experimenters, so that when the rat 
returned, anything that had been stored in these ‘degrade’ arms was not good to eat.  A strange result 
was obtained – the rats learned reasonably quickly in which arms they should avoid seeking food on 
their return to the apparatus, as they left the degrade arms well alone.  However they still continued to 
store food in these locations as much as in the other arms, even when there were fewer food morsels 
than arms and the rats could have eaten all pieces had they not stored them in the degrade arms.  In the 
recovery condition the rats showed an intact memory for the locations in which food would be ‘bad’, 
though they did seem capable of looking ahead to this condition when storing food, i.e., they were not 
storing food with the intension of later retrieving it, as this would surely have resulted in avoidance of 
the ‘degrade’ arms during the storing condition.  
 
The rat results are consistent with the Bischoff-Kohler hypothesis that animals cannot be shown to 
demonstrate behaviour unrelated to their current needs, i.e., that they appear to be “stuck in time”.  
Some studies with jays and pigeons are interesting and show flexible use of foresight and the presence 
of an anticipatory memory trace respectively, however it is only Corriea et al’s (2007) satiated jays and 
Naqshbandi et al’s (2006) monkeys that give substantial pause for future thought.  Are nonhumans 
really stuck in time or have we just not yet designed the behavioural tasks that will push them to travel 
through it? 
 
 
 
 
 
The Present Study 
The present study aims to design a methodology that will enable future-orientated behaviour to be 
demonstrated in rats.  If successful this will be the first positive result of its kind, and will pave the way 
for continued research into this ability in the rat.  Continued investigation may allow the formation of 
nonhuman and especially rat models of degenerative cognitive disease, aiding greater understanding of 
the area and ultimately the possibility of surgery or drugs that may postpone, relieve or prevent the 
debilitating symptoms of cognitive degeneration experienced by many humans. 
 
Effective future planning, then, rather than self-consciousness, is the focus of this study on mental time 
travel.  If participants are able to act flexibly in order to prepare for future needs that, crucially, are not 
currently being experienced, they could be considered to have an ability to mentally travel forwards to a 
specific point in their future even if, in the case of the nonhuman participants, they are not conscious of 
doing so. 
 
The present study will attempt to guide the animals’ behaviour by using anticipatory sensory specific 
satiety, similar to the aforementioned Correia et al (2007) experiment with jays.  A task will be designed 
such that if the rats are capable of anticipating satiation by a particular flavour, their behaviour will be 
reflective of their future planning for this upcoming satiation. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Sensory Specific Satiety - the groundwork 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This study is concerned with establishing whether or not rats are capable of future planning to the 
extent that they display behaviour that is clearly orientated towards the future, i.e., behaviour that only 
makes sense when considering the animals’ future rather than present needs, as described by Atance & 
O’Neil (2001) and Suddendorf & Busby (2005) as behavioural criteria required for nonhuman future 
planning.  The present study will utilise Sensory Specific Satiety (SSS).  This is the phenomenon whereby 
an animal that consumes one particular flavour to satiation subsequently finds the same flavour 
(texture, smell etc) reduced in pleasantness compared to other flavours (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1981).  This 
study is concerned with establishing whether or not the present group of rats are capable of anticipating 
satiation to a certain flavour and behaving accordingly in response to this anticipation.  This should 
mean that, given a choice between the anticipated flavour and an alternative, an animal will choose the 
alternative in order to preserve the future pleasantness of the anticipated flavour, as demonstrated by 
Raby, Alexis, Dickinson & Clayton (2007) who established this behaviour in scrub jays.  If a rat can predict 
exposure to satiating amounts of flavour A, and is offered an A/B flavour choice, the preferred flavour 
should be the one incongruous with the flavour that is expected, i.e., a greater proportion of flavour B 
should be consumed. This will make the subsequent opportunity to become satiated by flavour A much 
more rewarding.  If a rat does consistently demonstrate this anticipatory SSS it would suggest that there 
is at least some rudimentary capacity for true future planning, as this incongruous flavour choice holds 
no current benefit for the animal, and only makes sense if expectations of future experiences are taken 
into account. 
 
First however it must be established that the animals participating in the present study demonstrate 
normal SSS behaviour.  This will be investigated in the following chapter, however in order to effectively 
test for SSS it is necessary to first establish the quantities and timeframes required to satiate a rat that is 
not food deprived (as none of the current animals are in this study, all having ad libertum access to food 
and water), and the preferences for various flavours of pellet.  The SSS literature does not present a 
common result: some studies that require satiation simply provide a large excess of food over a 
relatively long period (3 hrs) in order to allow animals (in this case jays) to become satiated (Corriea, 
Dickinson & Clayton, 2007).  Some studies involving rats have simply allowed ad libertum access to the 
usual cage food for 24 hours in order to satiate the animals prior to test (Petrovich, Ross, Gallagher & 
Holland, 2007), or providing rats with an excess of 7g of food to consume following 20 hours of food 
deprivation (same authors).  Studies involving humans have ensured that human subjects eat nothing 
for 3-5 hours (or “since breakfast”) and then were allowed to eat as much as they liked of certain 
satiating foodstuffs (Hetherington, 1996; Guinard & Brun, 1998).  In terms of timeframe, Hetherington, 
Rolls & Burley (1989) found that the largest drop in pleasantness ratings in humans occurred within 2 
minutes of a satiating meal being consumed.  The same authors found that those foods that were most 
palatable were renewed in pleasantness within 1 hour of the food being consumed to satiety.  In terms 
of nonhumans however there is no current literature detailing the minimum amount of exposure time 
and amount of food required for a rat to eat until satiated.  This is not surprising, as several factors 
affect sensory specific satiety, for example Rolls & McDermott (1991) showed an effect of age, as elderly 
subjects demonstrated reduced sensory specific satiety, whereas the phenomenon was far more 
marked in young subjects.  Additionally the type of food consumed has an effect on SSS, with foods high 
in protein reducing more quickly in pleasantness than foods such as buttered roll and Coke (Vandewater 
& Vickers, 1992).  Indeed Smeets & Westerterp-Plantenga (2005) show that the timeframe of SSS (citing 
the greatest decrease in pleasantness as occurring within 20 minutes) suggests that the phenomenon is 
largely based on sensory experience rather than the post-absorptive effects of the food consumed.  All 
of this information is important with regards to the amount of food provided in order to bring about 
satiety in the current study: too little food will mean the animals do not experience satiety and so 
cannot possibly be expected to predict this state in later stages of the investigation, whereas using vastly 
surplus amounts of food is wasteful.  With regards to timeframe, this information can be utilised when 
designing a task that allows satiety to be reached and yet remains efficient.  These aspects of normal 
satiation will be investigated in experiment 1. 
 
Also important are the flavours to be used.  As before, the literature does not provide a convergent 
picture of which flavours may be universally preferred by rats, other than the well established 
preference across all species for sweet tastes and a general dislike for bitter flavours such as quinine 
(Berridge & Zajonc, 1991, and others).  The present study will investigate the preferences of certain 
flavours with the intent of eventually selecting three equally palatable flavours for the study, denoted A, 
B and C.  Two of these flavours (for example A and B) will be offered consistently as the standard flavour 
choice subsequent to satiation by any 1 of the 3 flavours A, B or C.  For example, an animal is exposed to 
one of the flavours A, B or C in isolation, and is then exposed to the standard A versus B flavour choice.  
This allows for a simple test of SSS: following satiation to flavour A in isolation the B choice should be 
subsequently preferred, and vice versa.  An animal satiated by flavour C in isolation need not (and in fact 
should not) show a consistent A/B preference at choice. Correia, Dickinson & Clayton (2007) 
demonstrated result similar to this when testing their jays for SSS.  The birds were provided with two 
foodstuffs at the same time – kibbles and pine nuts - on which to become satiated.  When the birds 
were subsequently offered a flavour choice consisting of the same 2 foods neither one was significantly 
preferred.  This is not precisely comparable with satiation to a relatively novel flavour or food (pretzels, 
for example), but the Correia et al (2007) result does show that if there is no satiation-based motivation 
to eat either of the foodstuffs when given a choice, then both flavours tend to be consumed in relatively 
equal proportions.  Alternatively in this situation an animal may revert to whichever flavour is 
individually preferred by that particular animal, therefore any obvious individual flavour preferences 
should be noted.  It is the intention however that the animals find each of the three flavours relatively 
equal in pleasantness, as a strong preference for (or avoidance of) any of the flavours may skew the 
results – particularly if the flavour/s in question is one of those offered at choice (A or B).  For example 
an animal that prefers flavour B may consume this flavour whenever offered an A versus B flavour 
choice, regardless of the flavour just experienced, or that anticipated.  Other (albeit human) literature 
has demonstrated that various levels of palatability have an effect on SSS and renewed flavour 
preference -  Johnson & Vickers (1992) found that less-preferred foods dropped more quickly in 
pleasantness, and to a greater extent.  The authors also demonstrate that the most palatable foods 
recover their pleasantness more quickly following satiation than less palatable foods.  Therefore for the 
present study it is important that the flavours used are equally palatable, in order that the animals are 
motivated to choose which flavour choice to consume based on experience rather than intrinsic 
preference, and that the pleasantness of the flavours are reduced and renewed at an equivalent rate.  
Flavour preference will therefore be investigated in experiment 2 of this chapter. 
 
Experiment 1 
Investigating the timeframes and consumption of Satiation 
 
2.2 Method 
 
2.2a Subjects 
The same subjects are used throughout the study.  10 experimentally naïve Dark Agouti male rats 
(Rattus norvegicus) were used.  The animals were housed in one group of four and two groups of three 
in diurnal conditions consisting of 12 hour light/dark cycles (light from 7am – 7pm).  The testing room 
was an approximately 60 second walk from the rats’ home room and included an ascending flight of 
stairs.  All tests were carried out after extensive habituation to this journey, until the rats’ behaviour on 
entering the testing room was relaxed and curious.  An elasticated white cloth entirely covered the 
cages during transportation to further reduce any stress.  All testing was carried out during the light 
cycle (finished by 6pm at the latest) and the animals had ad libertum access to food and water 
throughout the study, their main diet of nutritionally complete pellets supplemented with sunflower 
seeds scattered amongst their bedding.  All experiments were conducted according to the Animal 
(Scientific Procedure) Act (1986) and as permitted by the Home Office Project License. 
 
 
 
2.2b Apparatus 
A square enclosure measuring 100cm x 100cm x 40cm, made of wood and painted smooth grey on the 
inside, was positioned on a low table.  Directly above this enclosure a camera was attached to a bar 
running parallel to the ceiling of the testing room, approx 2m above the enclosure.  The monitor and 
DVD recorder to which the camera was attached were positioned approx 2.5m from the enclosure and 
faced away from it, such that the display could not cause a distraction for any animals in the enclosure.  
The experimenter sat as far as possible from the enclosure, behind the monitor.  An angular desk lamp 
was placed on the floor, centrally behind the enclosure, its shade angled downwards and towards the 
wall to provide a soft, low light throughout the room.  The windows in the door of the testing room 
were covered with black polythene.  Three flavours of food pellet were initially selected: bacon, 
cinnamon and ‘neutral’.  Separate food trays were used for each of the pellet flavours to prevent scent 
interference – the trays were translucent white plastic lids from Tupperware-style containers, all 
identical and measuring approx 20cm x 20cm with a small lip (<0.5cm) running around the edge. 
 
2.2c Design 
All animals were exposed to an identical procedure.  The initial phase of this experiment ran once a day 
for 12 days, the later stage ran once a day for a further 6 days.  A rat was recorded as ‘eating’ when it 
was physically doing just that – not when simply facing, nosing, holding or otherwise engaging with the 
food pellets.  The selected flavours were rotated such that after the initial 12 days each rat had 
experienced each flavour in the enclosure four times.  Rats were always tested in the same order, 1-10. 
 
 
2.2d Procedure 
i) Habituation: Rats were initially habituated to the grey enclosure in groups of cage mates, such that 
rats 1-4 were placed in the enclosure together, followed by rats 5-7 and then rats 8-10, for 15 minutes 
on day 1 and 30 minutes on day 2.  On day 3 the first cage was split so that rats 1 and 2 experienced the 
enclosure together for 30 minutes, followed by 3 and 4, and then followed again by the two cages of 
three rats.  On the fourth, fifth and sixth days the rats were placed in the enclosure individually for 30 
minutes, the lengthy habituation process reflecting the possibly intimidating nature of the large open 
enclosure.   
 
ii) Test: A tray of pellets (approx 5g – considered an excess) was placed in a random location in the 
enclosure.  The camera was started recording and rat 1 was placed in the enclosure.  Rat 1 remained and 
was filmed in the enclosure for 20 minutes, after which the animal was returned to the home cage, the 
camera was stopped and the amount of food eaten by the animal was gathered by weighing.  The pellet 
tray was then replenished so that it once again contained 5g of food, and was positioned in a different 
random location in the enclosure.  The procedure was repeated with rats 2-10. 
 
iii) Data consolidation: As above, the amount of food eaten by each rat each day was recorded.  The DVD 
recordings were viewed by the experimenter.  The amount of time (in seconds) that each rat spent 
eating during each of the 20 minutes was recorded, such that it was possible to establish when satiation 
occurred by noting which minute saw a drop in the amount of time spent eating.  To plot a clear 
satiation curve the data was chunked into five four-minute time slots (to give the number of seconds 
spent eating during minutes 1-4, 5-8 etc). 
2.3 Results 
 
Amount of food eaten 
 
As shown in fig 2.1, the average amount eaten per day rose fairly steadily from day one (0.13g) to day 12 
(1.48g), as the rats became habituated to eating in the enclosure, and to the pellets themselves. 
 
Fig 2.1: Average amount of flavoured pellets eaten per rat / per day, over 12 days  
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Fig 2.2 below shows there is an obvious habituation period while the rats become accustomed to eating 
in the enclosure, as during the first few days the average amount of time the animals spent eating per 4-
minute chunk of time is low (on average never reaching even 20 seconds eating time) and relatively 
erratic, with no obvious peak and subsequent drop-off, as demonstrated by the blue line on fig 2.2 
which shows the animals’ behaviour on day one.  At this point the rats are not being satiated as the 
characteristic reduction in pleasantness is not seen (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1981).  However by the final 
days of the animals’ exposure to this environment (day 12, shown by the red line on the above graph) 
there is a more obvious favoured time period for eating which begins on entering the enclosure (68 
seconds within the first 4 minutes) and drops to almost half this value by 8 minutes (35 seconds spent 
eating between 4 and 8 minutes).  This demonstrates the characteristic waning of interest due to a 
reduction in the pleasantness of the flavour being consumed, i.e., the animals have consumed this 
particular flavour to satiety.  The average overall amount of time spent eating is also much higher at this 
later stage (day 12 as compared to day 1, for example), with the animals eating for over a minute in the 
first four minutes on day 12.  By this point the rats are fully habituated to the enclosure and to eating in 
it. 
 
Fig 2.2: Comparing the satiation curves of day 1 (blue) and day 12 (red) - the average amount of time each rat 
spent eating per four-minute span during 20 minutes in the enclosure 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
Amount of food consumed 
The individual amounts eaten by each rat varied substantially, though the eating of all the animals 
increased with their experience of the enclosure.  The average amount eaten by the end of the 20-
minute trial was 1.48g.  Only twice did a rat (on both occasions rat 6) eat more than this, consuming 2.1 
and 2.6g on days 11 and 12 respectively.  As this was a considerably rare occurrence it was considered 
that 2g of food would be sufficient to satiate this group of animals.  It was not considered appropriate to 
present differing amounts of food to individual rats based on individual consumption rates, as larger or 
smaller amounts of food may have affect the animals’ baseline motivation to eat – i.e., studies with rats 
have demonstrated that a larger pile of food is consistently preferred over a smaller pile (N and Roberts, 
2006).  For this study it was considered that individual motivation for consumption of food should (as far 
as possible) be kept equal across the group. 
  
Timescale of satiety 
Given 20 minutes to explore the large enclosure and eat flavoured pellets at will, the rats on average 
dramatically reduced their initial consumption rate during the second 4 minute section of time, i.e., 
between 4 and 8 minutes.  However as seen from figure 2.2 above, the rats did not eat constantly while 
in the enclosure – even during the initial 4 minutes in the enclosure, just over 1 minute was spent 
physically eating the pellets, with the remaining time spent exploring the enclosure.  This suggested that 
the amount of time allowed for satiation here was not necessary, and that it should be possible for the 
animals to become satiated within a reduced amount of time.  If given less time in the enclosure the rats 
may learn to reduce their time spent exploring in favour of a greater initial amount of time spent eating, 
resulting in swifter satiation.  This would mean that any subsequent satiation tasks could be designed 
more efficiently, and the possibility was therefore investigated in the experiment below. 
 
 
Experiment 1 (part 2) 
Investigating satiation at five minutes 
 
2.5 Method 
 
 2.5a Apparatus 
 
This remained identical to the previous experiment. 
 
 2.5b Design 
 
This was identical to the above experiment apart from the reduced number of trials; six rather than 12 
were carried out. 
 
 2.5c Procedure 
 
This was identical to the above experiment, except that the animals were removed from the enclosure 
after five rather than 20 minutes.  This produced much shorter DVD recordings of the rats’ behaviour, 
such that the experimenter now ‘chunked’ the time spent in the enclosure into five one-minute periods, 
so that the resulting graphs show directly how many seconds were spent eating every  minute. 
 
 
 
2.6 Results 
 
Average overall amount of food eaten 
 
On day one of the five-minute-exposure trial the average amount eaten was 0.47g, considerably down 
on the 1.48g of the last day of the 20-minute-exposure trials.  Over the next two days however it 
appeared that the rats learnt that they would be removed from the enclosure sooner than before and 
began to eat greater amounts within their new five-minute time span, the average rising to 1.01g by day 
three (however over half the rats were eating above 1g).  Unfortunately a weekend fell halfway through 
this six-day run of testing, resulting in the rats appearing to ‘forget’ the enclosure/pellet scenario and 
regress in terms of how comfortable they were in the testing environment.  This caused a substantial 
drop in the amount of food eaten, reducing to an average of 0.17g on day four.  However as before the 
animals appeared to learn quickly and by day six the average amount eaten was up to 0.94g, again with 
half of the animals eating 1g or well above it. 
 
 
 
 
 
Timeframe of satiation 
 
As with the first few days of the 20-minute trials, the amount of time spent eating as the 5 minutes 
progressed was initially erratic (shown by the blue line on Fig 2.3 below), not showing the characteristic 
peak followed by a waning of temporally-assessed interest.   However by day 3 of the five-minute trials 
there was a recognisable curve in place, showing a substantial reduction in eating time after about 3 
minutes.  The aforementioned unhelpfully-placed weekend did not appear to have a large effect on the 
established satiation curve, with the three-minute point still marking a reduction in eating time even 
though the amounts being eaten were smaller than before.  The shape of the satiation curve remained 
intact from day 3, such that by day 6 (red line on fig 2.3 below) the only change had been an increase in 
the overall amount eaten.  The consistency of this curve suggested that as long as the animals were 
accustomed to the five-minute condition, they reached flavour-based satiety after about three minutes 
of exposure to the appropriate flavour. 
 Fig 2.3: Comparison of satiation curves on day 1 and day 6 of five-minute exposure, averaged across rats 
 
 
2.7 Discussion 
 
It appears possible to satiate rats to a certain flavour in 3 minutes, though to allow for a small margin of 
error a five minute exposure period to all subsequent flavours and contexts will be used.  This allows 
sufficient time for flavour satiation yet is more efficient than 20 minutes per rat and, importantly, does 
not compromise the amount eaten as even though the average amount eaten during the 5 minute trials 
is less than that eaten over the 20 minute trials (1.01g compared to 1.48g), the 20 minute trials 
commonly produced a second surge of eating near the end of this allotted time.  This result supports 
investigations by Hetherington, Rolls & Burley (1989) into the timeframe of SSS, which show that rats 
begin to resume their consumption of a satiated flavour within 20 minutes of the first initial reduction in 
pleasantness.  With regards the overall amount eaten, the amount consumed within a 20 minute trial 
would therefore include post-satiety ‘resumed’ consumption, which did not contribute towards the 
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animals’ initial satiation.  Therefore the reduction in average amount eaten from the 20 minute to the 5 
minute trials was not considered acceptable.  Additionally, as the five-minute time period does not allow 
for this resurgence in pleasantness it is even less likely that the animals would eat in excess of the 
designated 2g, confirming this as a sufficient amount of any flavour to bring about initial satiety to it. 
 
However the flavours and pellet types used in the above experiments were only samples and not 
available for any subsequent work, therefore the study was now concerned with habituating the animals 
to the new pellets and the contexts to be used, establishing flavour preferences, and beginning to pair 
the new flavours with the contexts in order to develop context-flavour associations which could then be 
utilised to test anticipatory sensory specific satiety. 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Establish flavour preference 
 
2.8 Method 
 2.8a Apparatus 
 
The 100cm x 100cm enclosure previously mentioned was divided into four equally sized square 
compartments, each measuring 0.25m x 0.25m (see Fig 2.4).  The thin boards of wood used to divide the 
enclosure measured 60cm high to ensure the animals were not able to jump or look over this partition.  
Three of the compartments became differently coloured/textured contexts - A, B and C.  Context A was 
striped with a sturdy wire mesh floor (mesh was square and 1cm2to ensure that it would not trap the 
animals’ feet).  Context B was painted entirely black with a transparent Perspex floor.  Context C was 
painted entirely white though no tactile floor was added.  The fourth compartment remained the colour 
and texture of the original enclosure, i.e., painted grey.   
 
 
Fig 2.4 The apparatus used, demonstrating the division of the original large enclosure into 4 separate 
compartments 
 
 This apparatus remained the same distance from the floor and the camera as before and identical food 
trays, lamp, etc were used.  The new food pellets were “Omnitreat” flavoured pellets, each weighing 
45mg and available in the following six flavours: chocolate, banana, peanut butter, tropical, pina colada 
and grape. 
 
 
 
  
2.8b Design 
 
Flavours were paired with the afore-described contexts as follows: context A = chocolate (henceforth 
‘flavour A’ etc), context B = tropical, context C = peanut.  The fourth (grey) compartment would be the 
neutral location for offering a flavour choice in later experiments, and this would always comprise the 
same two flavours, initially selected to be chocolate and tropical (A and B).  It was considered that any 
flavour choice should be offered in a relatively ‘neutral’ environment, as presenting a flavour choice in a 
compartment already associated with a certain flavour may result in choices being made based on 
simple familiarity or novelty seeking rather than SSS (i.e., an animal may choose a flavour simply 
because it is the ‘correct’ flavour for that context, or alternatively may choose the alternative because it 
is not and therefore more interesting).  Based on the previous experiments all contexts would be 
experienced for five minutes, and all food would be presented in amounts of 2g.  The design of this 
experiment serves to compare flavour preferences, associate contexts with flavours, habituate the rats 
to both the new food and the new environment, and to habituate the rats specifically to having a food 
choice in the decision box.  It should be acknowledged that three contexts (and therefore three 
accompanying flavours) were utilised here rather than the two that would be strictly necessary to 
investigate sensory specific satiety (the ‘same’ flavour and a ‘different’ flavour).  An extra context was 
used here in order to provide scope, should it become necessary, to investigate food choice prior to, or 
following, a ‘neutral’ context / flavour.  The extra context / flavour would also serve to increase the 
number of flavours with which the animals were familiar, which increases the chance of finding two 
flavours that are equally palatable for use in the decision box.  
 
In the initial habituation period the food trays were present in the contexts, though the food was not.  It 
was considered important to expose the animals to just one entirely new aspect of the procedure at a 
time, and the contexts were an easier starting point than the flavours in isolation.  Also this meant that 
from the animals’ very first experience of the new flavoured pellets they may begin to associate them 
with their respective contexts, with which they would already be familiar.  It was not considered 
necessary to habituate the animals to the contexts in pairs, based on the rats’ previous experience of 
the testing room and also due to the contexts being smaller and therefore less threatening than the 
original 100cm x 100cm enclosure.  Due to the partitions between the contexts being sufficiently high to 
prevent animals moving or looking from one context to another, up to four animals could be habituated 
at one time, one in each section. 
 
 
 2.8c Procedure 
 
Habituation 
Each rat experienced each context for 10 minutes, twice, on day 1 of habituation and 20 minutes, once a 
day, on days two and three.  By the end of this third day of habituation all the rats appeared 
comfortable in the different contexts, therefore testing could begin. 
 
 
 
Testing 
Each rat experienced each context and its appropriate flavour for five minutes, three times a day for 
seven days.  The decision box did not contain food on the first day of testing due to a problem with the 
food trays, though this was rectified and this enclosure contained food along with the others from day 2.  
The animals were rotated though the enclosures in am, noon and pm sessions in such a way as to avoid 
time of day effects.  The animals’ behaviour was filmed and the amount of food consumed in each 
context and in the decision box was recorded each day and averaged across rats as well as across days. 
 
 
 
 
2.9 Results 
There is no real habituation effect for any of the context flavours, i.e., the amount of each flavour eaten 
each day remains relatively stable and there appears to be three clear ‘levels of preference’, shown by 
the green, red and blue lines on fig 2.5. 
 
Fig 2.5 Average amount of flavour A, B and C eaten per rat / per session  
 
 
Assessing A / B / C flavour preference in context 
 
The mean amounts consumed of each of the three flavours were as follows, shown on fig 2.6 below: A 
(chocolate) = 0.46g, B (tropical) = 0.05g, C (peanut) = 0.74g.  This strongly suggests that tropical is the 
least popular flavour.   
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Fig 2.6: Mean amount of flavours A, B and C consumed in context, per rat / per session 
 
A one-way ANOVA (Repeated Measures Design) conducted on the data showed that there is a main 
effect here F (2,18)  = 17.643, sig = < 0.05.  Matched-pairs t-tests showed that the mean amount of 
chocolate consumed (0.46g) was significantly higher than the mean amount of tropical consumed 
(0.05g): T9 = 4.809, sig < 0.05 and also  that the mean amount of peanut consumed (0.74g) was 
significantly higher than the mean amount of tropical consumed: T9 = -5.660, sig < 0.05.  There was no 
significant difference between the mean mounts of chocolate and peanut flavours consumed: T9 = -
2.030, sig = 0.073.   
 
Assessing A / B flavour preference in the decision box 
 
It was important to assess the amounts of chocolate and tropical pellets consumed in the decision box 
as well as in context, to determine if eating behaviour (and preferences) in the presence of a flavour 
choice differs from that when one flavour is presented in isolation (as in context):  Averaged across rats, 
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the amount of the chocolate choice eaten in the decision box was 0.36g, and the tropical choice 0.036g 
(means shown below on fig 2.7).  A matched-pairs t-test confirmed that there was a significant 
difference between these two means (t9 = 3.788, sig < 0.05), i.e., when offered a straight choice in the 
decision box, significantly more chocolate than tropical was consumed. 
 
Fig 2.7: Amount of chocolate and tropical eaten per rat / per session in the decision box 
 
Overall eating: time of day effect 
 
Taking all eating in the contexts and in the decision box averaged across rats, slightly more was 
consumed in the morning session (0.42g) than in the noon (0.37g) or the afternoon (0.37g) sessions, as 
shown on fig 2.8 below.  A one way ANOVA (repeated measures) was used to compare these means, 
and none of these differences were found to be significant: F (2,18) = 0.565, sig = 0.578.  At this stage 
therefore and for the current procedure it can be said that time of day has no bearing on the amount of 
food consumed. 
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 Fig 2.8: Average amount eaten per rat / per session at different times of day – all flavours in all enclosures  
 
 
 
 
2.10 Discussion  
 
Flavour preference in context  
 
The above results show that the animals ate significantly lower amounts of tropical flavour than either 
chocolate or peanut.  This is particularly problematic as Tropical was selected to be one of the two 
‘choice’ flavours in the decision box, the consumption of which, compared to the consumption of the 
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other decision box flavour (chocolate), would be used as a later measure of sensory specific satiety and 
anticipatory sensory specific satiety.  Equally, given the very small absolute amounts of tropical flavour 
consumed in context, it was unlikely that an animal would eat sufficient quantities of this flavour to 
become satiated by it, meaning it would not be possible to reliably test sensory specific satiety using this 
flavour. 
 
Flavour preference in decision box 
 
As with eating in context, flavour preference in the decision box was calculated using matched-pairs t-
tests (as throughout much of the current study).  However, an assumption of this test is that the 
observations (i.e., the amounts of the two flavours consumed) are independent, and it could be argued 
here that this is not the case as it is not possible for the animals to eat both flavours simultaneously.  
This means the consumption of one flavour could be said to affect consumption of the other as (for 
instance) switching between flavours would take time.  It is possible however for the animals to 
consume the different flavours in the decision box at different rates, which may rectify the issue to 
some extent (at least in terms of the time taken to switch between them).  For studies using similar 
designs this issue should be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
 
When offered a choice between the chocolate and tropical flavours in the decision box, the animals 
preferred chocolate, eating a significantly greater amount of this flavour.  This is problematic again as it 
is the decision box flavour choice that will eventually form the critical test element of this investigation 
and so these two flavours should be as equal in preference as possible.  As the tropical flavour appears 
to be equally disliked both when offered as part of a choice as well as in context when there is no 
alternative for the rats to choose, this flavour (B) will be replaced with an alternative flavour B.  This 
alternative will be paired with chocolate in the decision box and stand alone in context B.  The following 
experiment details the introduction of banana as the new flavour B. 
 
Experiment 3 – introducing Banana as Flavour B 
 
2.11 Method 
 2.11a Apparatus 
 
This remained the same as in the previous experiment, apart from the use of tropical flavoured pellets, 
which were not used further.  Banana pellets, this flavour chosen randomly from the three remaining 
alternatives, formed the replacement.  New food trays were also introduced for the new flavour. 
 
 2.11b Design 
 
It was necessary to not only swiftly habituate the rats to the banana flavour itself, but also to the pairing 
of the banana flavour with context B as well as eating banana in the decision box alongside chocolate.  
Over this habituation period the animals experienced twice the number of exposures to banana in 
context B than the other (familiar) flavours in contexts A and C, as well as twice the number of 
exposures to the decision box (with the new chocolate-versus-banana pairing) than in the previous run 
of habituation trials.  This experimental avenue lasted three days, considered sufficient to bring the rats 
‘up to speed’ with the new banana flavour.  
 
 
 
 
 2.11c Procedure 
 
Each rat experienced five minutes in each one of three contexts, three times a day as before.  The 
animals’ experience of the enclosures was rotated such that at each time of day each rat experienced 1) 
banana in context, 2) the newly-paired decision box and 3) either one of the other two other flavours in 
its respective context (rotated).  The trials were filmed as before and the amounts eaten of each flavour 
were recorded and averaged per rat / per session. 
 
 
 
2.12 Results 
 
Fig 2.10: Average amount of chocolate, banana and peanut flavour eaten per rat / per occasion in context  
 
 
Fig 2.10 shows that in context B banana appears to have been accepted as on a par with the other 
flavours.  The amount of banana eaten in context was 1.01g averaged across rats and exposures – much 
closer to the favoured peanut (0.93g) than chocolate (0.43g).   A one way ANOVA (repeated measures) 
demonstrated there was a main effect of flavour: F2,18 = 4.689, sig = 0.023.  Matched-pairs t-tests 
showed that a significantly smaller mean amount of chocolate was eaten than banana (T9 = -2.913, sig < 
0.05) and also that a smaller mean amount of chocolate was eaten than peanut (T9 = -2.402, sig = 
0.040).  There was no significant difference between the mean amounts of banana and peanut 
consumed (T9 = 0.363, sig = 0.725). 
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Fig 2.11 below shows that in the decision box, similar proportions of chocolate and banana are eaten as 
in context: chocolate in decision box = 0.31g, banana in decision box = 0.56g.  A matched-pairs t-test was 
carried out and demonstrated that these means (fig 2.11) are not significantly different:  T9 = -0.978, sig 
= 0.354, i.e., relatively equivalent amounts of chocolate and banana were consumed in the decision 
box.  In the decision box it was also observed that on the majority of occasions (25 out of 30) the 
animals appear to make an initial flavour choice and then exclusively consume that flavour during that 
session in the decision box, ignoring the alternative. 
 
Fig 2.11: Average amount of chocolate and banana eaten per rat / per session in the decision box 
 
 
Following the establishment of a pair of flavours that are equivalent in terms of palatability (chocolate 
and banana, above), the overall amounts of food consumed per session in context and per session in the 
decision box were compared.  It would be reasonable to expect that greater proportions would be 
consumed in the decision box, as the SSS literature (e.g., Johnson & Vickers, 1992; Rolls, 2005; Rolls, 
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Duijenvoorde & Rowe, 1983) demonstrates that a choice of flavours (colours, textures, etc) to eat 
results in greater overall consumption.  Fig 2.12 below shows the average amounts of food (all flavours) 
eaten in context and in the decision box (note figure for decision box includes both chocolate and 
banana). 
 
Fig 2.12: Average total amount of food eaten in context and in the decision box, per rat / per session 
 
A matched-pairs t-test showed that these means were not significantly different: 
T9 = -0.233, sig = 0.821. 
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2.13 Discussion 
Comparing consumption across flavours 
 
In context, the mean amounts of peanut and banana consumed were not significantly different, a 
positive finding that shows the recently introduced banana flavour was accepted on a par with the 
already relatively popular peanut flavour.  Indeed, the mean amount of banana eaten was significantly 
higher than that of the more established chocolate (though we can rule out novelty of the new flavour 
as the driving force due to the aforementioned non significant result when banana was compared to 
peanut).  It could potentially be a cause for concern if it was the case that banana flavour was universally 
preferred to chocolate as it is these two flavours that are paired in the decision box and would 
consistently comprise the critical flavour choice when testing SSS in the next chapter.  However on 
comparing the mean amounts of these two flavours eaten whilst in the decision box, there was no 
significant difference, meaning when these two flavours are presented together, one is no more likely to 
be consumed than the other.  Nevertheless, the preferences of these two flavours will be monitored. 
 
Comparing amounts consumed in context and the decision box 
 
There was no significant difference between the average amount of food consumed per session in 
context (when a flavour was presented in isolation) and the average amount of food consumed per 
session in the decision box (when chocolate and banana flavour were presented simultaneously).  This is 
perhaps counterintuitive, as the SSS literature asserts that greater variety results in larger amounts 
consumed, for all species including humans (Johnson & Vickers, 1992; Rolls, 2005; Rolls, Duijenvoorde & 
Rowe, 1983).  This is because after an animal has consumed one kind of flavour its relative pleasantness 
decreases, resulting in a reduced rate of consumption.  The opportunity to sample a variety of flavours 
means this ‘flavour fatigue’ does not develop to the same extent and therefore the consumption rate 
should remain relatively high.  This phenomenon has been demonstrated with many species and across 
many sensory qualities, to the extent that humans will consume greater quantities of sweets if there are 
multiple colours to choose from (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1982).  However the eating behaviour of these 
animals suggests that the choice element in the decision box has no bearing on the amount of food 
consumed in any one session.  It is interesting that on the majority of occasions, the animals consume 
just one of the two flavours in the decision box and it is therefore possible that the animals are to some 
extent unaware of the opportunity to sample both flavours, or simply are not inclined to do so.  This 
should not be problematic for the present study as long as the animals are equally inclined to sample 
either flavour in the decision box, which has shown to be the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.14 Overall Discussion 
 
In line with findings by Smeets & Westerterp-Plantenga (2006), it appears that 5 minutes exposure to a 
particular flavour is sufficient for satiation to occur for the current group of animals.  In the absence of 
literature providing guidance on how much food may be required to satiate a rat, the present results 
were taken as a good indication, and it was decided that 2g would be more than sufficient for a rat to 
produce a state of satiety in one of the current animals.  There was also little specific information in the 
literature with regards to the flavours that rats may find more or less preferable, beyond sweet flavours 
such as glucose solution being liked and bitter solutions such as quinine being disliked (Berridge & 
Zajonc, 1991; and others).  The present investigation into palatable flavours found that chocolate, 
banana and peanut flavoured pellets are consumed in sufficient, and sufficiently similar, amounts for 
these flavours to form the basis of this continuing SSS investigation.  Tropical flavoured pellets, when 
tested here, were almost entirely ignored by the animals, demonstrating a dislike of this particular 
flavour.  Banana and chocolate flavour pellets were paired to form the flavour choice that would be 
presented later to the animals as part of the test first for sensory specific satiety (SSS) and then for 
anticipatory SSS.  There was no significant difference between the amounts of these two flavours 
consumed in the decision box, hence this pairing is considered a suitable one.  This is an important 
consideration for any study of SSS, and something Correia et al (2007) tested for also, i.e., it was 
established that the scrub jays in their study found pine seeds and dog biscuits equally palatable 
foodstuffs, such that any consumption of one foodstuff over the other at test could be confidently linked 
to experimental manipulations rather than a base flavour preference.  The present results show that all 
animals are willing to eat either flavour in the decision box, however it is rare for both available flavours 
to be sampled.  This result is unexpected; according to the SSS literature the increased variety in the 
decision box should result in both flavours being consumed and therefore a larger amount of food eaten 
overall, for example Johnson & Vickers (1992) demonstrated that the pleasantness of high variety meals 
reduces more slowly than the pleasantness of low-variety meals, and Rolls, Rowe & Rolls (1982) 
established that providing a variety of different coloured sweets induced humans to consume more than 
if only a single colour was offered.  For the purposes of this study however it is sufficient that the 
animals consume large enough quantities in the decision box and in context to reliably assess flavour 
preference.   
 
The next step of the study is to establish whether these ten animals demonstrate ‘normal’ SSS, shown to 
be a robust phenomenon across many species and sensory characteristics by Rolls and colleagues (1981, 
1982, 2005, etc) – i.e., after being satiated by flavour A, do the animals choose alternative flavour B 
when subsequently offered an A/B flavour choice?  The next chapter will investigate this question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Establishing SSS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter was concerned with investigating how much food is required to satiate rats (2g), 
the timeframe required (5 minutes) and the flavours of pellet that the animals enjoy to a similar extent 
(chocolate, banana and peanut).  The current chapter is concerned with establishing whether the 10 
current animals would demonstrate sensory specific satiety (SSS).  This phenomenon refers to the 
perceived pleasantness of a food decreasing with continued consumption, resulting in other foods being 
subsequently preferred (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1981).  With increasing amounts of a certain flavour or 
texture etc consumed, the neurons that initially responded vigorously to that particular combination of 
sensory qualities begin to respond less and less, rendering the food less pleasant to eat  (Rolls, 2005).  
An alternative flavour or texture that is represented by neurons that have not been subject to this 
reduction in activity is therefore more pleasant to eat. 
 
SSS is a useful tool to utilise for this study due to the robust nature of the phenomenon – there is a large 
amount of literature demonstrating the proclivity of animals to consume an alternative flavour following 
extensive exposure to an original flavour.  This is shown across many species – humans (Rolls et al 1981), 
primates (Scott, Yan & Rolls, 1995) and rats (Rolls & Van Duijenvoorde, 1983) as well as across sensory 
qualities – taste and smell (Duclaux, Feisthauer & Cabanac, 1973), texture (Guinard & Brun 1998) and 
even the colour of food (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1982) As an instinctive behaviour that promotes natural 
variety in the diet it requires no training.  It is easy to demonstrate behaviourally and results are quick to 
achieve and simple to measure.   
 
However what is not clear, and the focus of this study, is whether rats can anticipate satiation to a 
particular flavour.  If this is the case an animal offered a choice between two flavours while expecting 
satiation to one of them in the near future, would find the alternative more pleasant to eat (Raby, 
Alexis, Dickinson & Clayton, 2007).  An animal showing this behaviour would demonstrate an ability 
similar to that described as ‘future planning’ or ‘episodic future thinking’ in humans, i.e., acting in 
response to a future motivational state rather than one currently being experienced (Atance & O’Neil, 
2005).  Experiments with scrub jays have demonstrated that this species appears capable of this kind of 
satiation anticipation (Correia, Dickinson & Clayton, 2007), such that these birds will ignore current SSS-
based drives and choose to cache a type of food to which they have just been exposed for 3 hours, 
because they are aware that just prior to retrieving their caches they will be presented with an 
alternative flavour, rendering the cached flavour more palatable than it is at present. 
 
This study ultimately seeks to establish whether rats will alter their eating behaviour in such a way that 
makes it obvious that they are making provision for a future occasion in which their needs will be 
different from those currently being experienced, i.e., by choosing to eat the flavour that is different to 
that which they will soon be satiated on.  However it is first necessary to establish that the current group 
of animals are able to display ‘normal’ SSS behaviour prior to investigating whether or not the animals 
will show anticipatory SSS (see next chapter). 
The rats will be exposed to satiating amounts of a certain flavour in the appropriate context (chocolate, 
banana or peanut) for 5 minutes, and then the rats will be removed from the context and placed in a 
neutral decision box and presented with a flavour choice, which will always be chocolate versus banana.  
If the animals demonstrate SSS, after eating chocolate in context, an animal will eat a greater proportion 
of banana (in this case the incongruous flavour) than chocolate (the congruous flavour) in the decision 
box, and vice versa.  Following consumption of peanut flavour in context, the animals will have no 
reason to prefer either chocolate or banana flavour in the decision box, and therefore may be expected 
to sample both flavours, behaviour shown by Correia, Dickinson & Clayton’s (2007) jays, demonstrating 
a reduced drive towards either one of the flavours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2Method 
Experiment 1: testing SSS 
 
The subjects and apparatus remained identical to the previous chapter  
 
3.2a Design 
The test animals experienced the following sequence (see fig 3.1) 
 
1. placed in context A, B or C, with 2g of the appropriate flavour (5 min) 
2. moved to decision box, containing an chocolate vs. banana flavour choice (5 min) 
 
Fig 3.1: sequence of movements to test sensory specific satiety 
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This occurred twice a day, first in the morning at approximately 9am then again at 3pm.  The time delay 
between sessions and others later in the study was at least three hours.  Experiments by Hetherington, 
Rolls & Burely (1989) demonstrated that the pleasantness of a satiated food was to a large extent 
restored an hour after satiation, therefore this six hour delay was considered more than sufficient to 
ensure earlier testing sessions did not interfere with later ones.   
 
Throughout the testing days the rats experienced contexts in the consistent order: A followed by B 
followed by C.  In the decision box the left/right positioning of the A/B trays in the morning and 
afternoon was counterbalanced.  This meant that after 6 days each rat had experienced 12 runs 
altogether and so four in each context, meaning two in the morning and two in the afternoon, and one 
of these with A on the outside of the decision box, and one with B on the outside. 
 
 
3.2b Procedure 
 
A rat was placed in context, with the appropriate flavour already present, as the timer and video 
recorder were started.  The rat was filmed for five minutes, then the recorder was stopped and the tray 
of food was removed and weighed to establish the amount of food eaten.  The rat remained in context 
while the food was weighed and the amount recorded, then the rat was picked up and placed in the 
decision box with the A and B food trays already present.  The timer and recorder were started once 
again, and after five minutes these were both stopped and the rat removed from the decision box and 
returned to its home cage.  The amounts of flavours A and B consumed were recorded. When possible 
more than one rat tested simultaneously, by running in more than one context at a time, and staggering 
the start times such that only one rat needed to be in the decision box at any one time. 
 
If an animal ate flavour A in context and then continues to eat flavour A when transferred to the 
decision box, this animal would have eaten congruously (i.e., ate the same flavour).  An animal that ate 
flavour A in context followed by flavour B in the decision box would be said to have eaten incongruously 
(i.e., ate the alternative flavour).  It is this incongruous eating behaviour that would demonstrate SSS. 
 
 
The data were processed by calculating a simple ratio comparing how much of the incongruous flavour 
was consumed as compared to the congruous flavour, giving an ‘incongruity score’.   
 
 
 
 The incongruity score was calculated as described below, such that a score of +1 would mean that all 
animals ate entirely incongruously, i.e., that after eating A in context all animals ate nothing but B in the 
decision box, and vice versa.  A score of -1 would show the opposite, and a score of zero would 
demonstrate that on average the animals showed no flavour preference in the decision box whatsoever.  
The overall group mean score is then compared to zero via a single sample t-test, to establish whether it 
is statistically different from the zero ‘chance’ value. 
 The calculation to establish the average incongruity score is set out below; for each animal, the average 
amount of congruous flavour eaten in the decision box was subtracted from the average amount of 
incongruous flavour eaten in the decision box, and the result was divided by the total amount of food 
eaten in the decision box.  Dividing the amounts of each flavour eaten by the total amount eaten may 
help to control for individual animals consuming different amounts of food, as well as providing an easy 
to read score for each individual animal: 
 
 
 
(Incongruous eating in decision box) – (congruous eating in decision box) 
(Total amount eaten) 
 
 
For example, after exposure to context A, a rat eating entirely incongruously would only consume 
flavour B subsequently in the decision box – for example maybe this animal eats 0.5g of B. 
 
Therefore incongruous minus congruous eating here gives 0.5 – 0 = 0.5. 
Dividing this resulting 0.5 by the total amount eaten (0.5g) would give 0.5/0.5 = 1.   
 This demonstrates that entirely incongruous eating produces a maximum incongruous eating score of 1 
which would show perfect SSS.  Conversely if an animal eats entirely congruously (consumes only A in 
the decision box following A in context for example) this would result in a minimum score of -1.  As 
aforementioned, a score of zero means that an animal eats equal amounts of A and B in the decision box 
regardless of the flavour previously experienced. 
 
This calculation then is a measure of an animal’s preference for the incongruous flavour over the 
congruous or vice versa, and means that this one score takes into account the amount of A and B eaten 
in the decision box following exposure to A in context, and the amount of A and B eaten in the decision 
box following exposure to B in context.  A more positive score shows the incongruous flavour is 
preferred over the congruous (A is preferred after B, and B is preferred after A) and a more negative 
score the opposite (A is preferred after A and B is preferred after B).  Also as aforementioned, the score 
calculated is compared statistically to that score which would be achieved by chance – i.e., a score of 
zero resulting from the animals eating equal quantities of A and B in the decision box as if the animals 
had no preference.  This will determine if any apparent preference for one flavour over the other can be 
accepted as statistically significant.   
 
 
In addition to this calculation, it was decided to test once again for time of day effects to determine 
whether eating in the morning or the afternoon might have a bearing on the amount of food consumed.  
It was considered appropriate to investigate time of day effects at this particular stage because the 
procedure as it currently stands is now very similar to the procedures to be used for the remainder of 
the study, in terms of the apparatus used and the pattern of flavour-exposure.  Therefore any time of 
day effect at this stage could be expected to reoccur at future points and would need to be taken into 
account when designing the future planning test. 
 
 
3.3 Results 
 
First it was determined whether the rats demonstrated incongruous eating (SSS), as explained above, 
and the incongruity score for each rat and the average for the group is shown below in table 3.1. 
 
Incongruity scores 
Table 3.1:  Incongruity scores for each rat, and averaged. 
 
Rat Incongruous eating score 
 
1 -0.2 
 
2 0.076 
 
3 0 
 
4 0.98 
 
5 0.021 
 
6 0.62 
  
7 0.33 
 
8 -0.016 
 
9 -0.51 
 
10 0.92 
 
Average 0.22 
 
 
As aforementioned, a score of zero demonstrates that equal amounts of the congruous and incongruous 
flavours were eaten in the decision box regardless of the flavour previously experienced in context 
(animal three demonstrates this perfect zero score above).  A score above zero demonstrates that more 
of the incongruous flavour is eaten relative to the congruous flavour.  This means that if an animal is 
exposed to context A (and therefore accompanying flavour A) and then placed in the decision box with 
an A/B flavour choice, more B than A would be consumed here.  A score of 1 demonstrates that only the 
incongruous flavour is consumed in the decision box, i.e., that in the above scenario a rat eats only 
flavour B.  This would suggest that an animal had been successfully satiated by flavour A in context, 
resulting in this flavour seeming subsequently less pleasant in the decision box, resulting in flavour B 
being consumed exclusively. 
 
On average the animals present an incongruous eating score of 0.22.  To assess whether or not this 
demonstrates genuine tendency towards SSS it is necessary to establish whether this mean score is 
significantly different to the mean incongruity score which would be expected by chance, i.e., if there 
was no flavour preference in context, i.e., a score of zero.  A single sample t-test was carried out, 
comparing each score to the theoretical zero score as explained above: t9 = -1.449, sig = 0.181 
demonstrating that there is no significant difference between the score obtained and the chance score 
of zero. 
 
This result may be influenced by flavour preference; it was observed in the previous chapter that, 
following the introduction of banana flavoured pellets, this flavour was consumed significantly more 
than chocolate by the animals when in context.  At that stage there was no significant difference 
between the consumption of those two flavours in the decision box so it was appropriate to continue 
with this pairing.  However it was now important to revisit the possibility of a flavour preference in order 
to determine the reason for these animals not showing SSS here.  As aforementioned, the incongruity 
score calculated above expressed the relative amount of incongruous eating in the decision box 
following exposure to context A and context B.  In order to investigate flavour preference further, 
separate incongruity scores were calculated for decision box eating following exposure to contexts A 
and B: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2:  Incongruity scores for each rat following exposure to context A and context B 
Rat 
Incongruous eating score 
following context A 
Incongruous eating score 
following context B 
 
1 0.60 -1.00 
 
2 
 
-0.18 
 
0.33 
 
3 1.00 -1.00 
 
4 0.96 1.00 
 
5 0.88 -0.84 
 
6 1.00 0.24 
 
7 1.00 -0.33 
 
8 0.97 -1.00 
 
9 -0.90 -0.11 
 
10 0.83 1.00 
 
Average 0.62 -0.17 
 
As shown in table 3.2, the average incongruity score for the group of animals is considerably higher 
following exposure to context A (0.62) than exposure to context B (-0.17).  As before, these average 
scores were compared using single sample t-tests to the theoretical zero scores which would occur for 
each animal if congruous and incongruous eating was the same.  For the post-A congruity score: T9 = -
3.024, sig <0.05 and for the post-B incongruity score: T9 = 0.679, sig = 0.514.  These results show that 
the higher mean score following context A is significantly different from zero and means that after 
exposure to context A the animals consume more of flavour B relative to flavour A.  However the score 
following exposure to flavour B in context is not significantly different from zero – i.e., after exposure to 
context B an animal is no more likely to consume incongruous flavour A than congruous flavour B.  This 
means that SSS occurred following exposure to flavour A but not B, which points to a flavour B 
preference. 
 
As planned, the average amounts of chocolate and banana consumed in context and in the decision box 
were examined.  Fig 3.2 below shows the average amount of chocolate and banana consumed in the 
decision box.  As the aim was to establish a general flavour preference unrelated to the context 
previously experienced, all decision box eating was included in the calculation including that which 
occurred after exposure to context (and therefore flavour) C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.2: The average amount of chocolate (A) and banana (B) eaten per rat / per session in the decision box 
(including following flavour C in context) 
 
 
 
Fig 3.2 shows that when comparing average amounts of chocolate and banana eaten across all occasions 
in the decision box, a higher mean amount of banana (0.34g) than chocolate (0.093g) was consumed – 
and in fact all but two of the animals ate greater amounts of banana than chocolate flavour.  A matched-
pairs t-test showed that this difference was significant: T9 = -2.291 sig < 0.05.   
 
As planned, the amounts of chocolate and banana eaten in context were also examined, in order to 
determine whether the banana preference established above was just a feature of decision box eating 
(i.e., involving a direct flavour choice), or whether greater amounts of banana than chocolate were also 
consumed in context when these flavour was experienced in isolation.  Fig 3.4 below shows the average 
amounts of chocolate and banana consumed in context throughout the testing period.  A matched-pairs 
t-test on the data demonstrated there was no significant difference between the mean amounts of A 
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(0.66g) or B (0.78g) eaten in context: t9= -1.359, sig = 0.207.  It would appear then that both flavours are 
equivalently palatable in isolation, however when offered a choice nearly all animals would prefer 
banana. 
 
Fig 3.4: The average amounts eaten of flavours A and B in context, per rat / per session 
 
 
As aforementioned, it was also considered important to assess any impact of a time of day effect on 
amount of food eaten.  The mean amount of food consumed per session in context (all 3 flavours 
combined) and the mean amount consumed in the decision box (both flavours A and B) was calculated, 
shown on fig 3.5 below. 
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Fig 3.5: Average amount of food consumed per rat / per session in the morning and in the afternoon, for both 
eating in context and eating in the decision box: 
 
 
A repeated-measures two-way ANOVA was carried out on the data shown in fig 3.5 above to establish if 
the mean amount of food consumed was affected by time of day, location of consumption, or an 
interaction between the two.  The results demonstrated that there was no effect of time of day 
(equivalent amounts of food were eaten overall in the morning and the afternoon): F 1,9 = 0.356, sig = 
0.566 and no overall effect of location: F 1,9 = 4.005, sig = 0.076.  However there was an effect of the 
interaction between location and time of day, with time of day having differing effects in context and 
the decision box: F 1,9 = 8.072, sig = <0.05.  Matched-pairs t-tests were carried out to further investigate 
this. 
 
In the mornings, significantly greater amounts were consumed in context (0.84g) than in the decision 
box (0.37g): t 9= 2.742, sig = <0.05.  However in the afternoons there was no such difference in context 
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(0.66g) and decision box (0.50g) eating: t 9= 1.015, sig = 0.337.  In addition, greater amounts were eaten 
in context in the morning (0.84g) than were eaten in context in the afternoon (0.66g): t 9= 2.934, sig = 
<0.05.  However there was no difference in the amount eaten in the decision box in the morning (0.37g) 
and afternoon (0.50g): t 9= -0.520, sig = 0.163. 
 
Taken together, these results show it is not the case that the animals eat most ‘in the morning’ or that 
the animals eat most when in context, but they do eat more when in context in the morning, i.e., the 
animals eat more of the first experimental food to which they are exposed on any given day.  Therefore 
in the following chapter, as the first food to be experienced in any critical testing run will be the food 
choice in the decision box, it will be preferable to carry out critical tests for future planning in the 
morning, to take advantage of this initial eagerness to consume the first food experienced. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Discussion  
 
The average incongruity score (0.22) is not significantly different from that score that would be obtained 
by chance, i.e., if the rats showed no flavour preference whatsoever (a score of zero).  This means that 
the animals do not consume proportionally more of the incongruous than the congruous flavour when 
presented with a flavour choice in the decision box, therefore the above experiment does not 
demonstrate that this group of animals show SSS.  If decision box eating following flavour A and B in 
context is separated out, it can be seen that the eating behaviour following each of these two flavours is 
different.  Following flavour A in context the animals consume significantly greater absolute amounts of 
flavour B than A in the decision box.  However following flavour B in context there is no significant 
difference between the absolute amounts of A and B eaten in the decision box.  Therefore SSS could be 
said to occur following flavour A in context (more B subsequently eaten), but not following flavour B in 
context (equal amounts subsequently eaten).  This would suggest that there is a preference for flavour B 
in the decision box which facilitates this result for SSS following flavour A.  Subsequent analysis to 
investigate this showed that in the decision box, the average amount of B consumed per occasion is 
significantly higher than the respective amount of A consumed.  Therefore in the decision box there is a 
significant preference on average for flavour B over A. 
 
However there is no such flavour preference when considering flavours A and B in context – i.e., when 
presented with the flavours in isolation there is no significant difference in the amount of each flavour 
consumed.  This means it can be assumed that regardless of the context to which the animals are 
exposed prior to the decision box, the amounts of food consumed therein will have been relatively 
similar.  Despite the flavours appearing equally palatable in isolation, if given a direct choice between 
the two flavours in the decision box the animals on average do prefer flavour B. 
 
This presents a problem as it is the amounts eaten in the decision box that will form the basis of 
conclusions regarding the animals’ tendencies towards SSS and subsequently their future planning 
abilities.  It is therefore important that the two flavours offered in the decision box are equivalently 
palatable to the extent that the tendency to eat either one of them can be altered by the flavour 
previously experienced by an animal (i.e., more A is eaten after B and vice versa).  When the same 
flavour choice is later used to test future planning, it is important that the animals’ choice is affected 
only by their anticipation of upcoming satiation, rather than a current intrinsic preference for one 
flavour more than the other. 
 
For this reason it was considered important for the decision box flavours to be changed such that A and 
B would no longer be paired.  B and C would be tested to establish if these flavours could form a more 
equally weighted decision box.  If successful, the animals should demonstrate SSS when subsequently 
tested under the new B vs. C decision box circumstances. 
 
As the rats still consumed flavour A in context it was not necessary to remove the flavour from the 
study, as had been required previously with the tropical flavoured pellets.  Therefore context A 
remained associated with chocolate (which remained flavour A), but the decision box would now 
feature flavour B (banana) and flavour C (peanut).  The following experiment describes the swapping 
process and assesses its success. 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 2: swapping A for C in the decision box 
 
3.5 Method 
 The subjects and apparatus remained the same as before  
 
3.5a Design 
 
To successfully habituate the animals to a decision box containing flavours B and C, they were exposed 
exclusively to this environment for several days. It was not considered necessary to intersperse this with 
experience of the flavours in context, as this aspect of the design remained entirely unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 3.5b Procedure 
 
Each rat experienced the ‘new’ decision box three times a day (at approximately 9am, 12 noon and 3pm) 
for two days, for five minutes each time (60 runs in total).  The food trays containing pellets were 
present whenever a rat was placed into the decision box.  Each run of was recorded as before using the 
same video recorder, and after each run the amounts of B and C consumed were weighed and recorded, 
and the trays replenished before the next rat placed in the decision box.  The banana and peanut trays 
were left/right alternated such that each rat experienced both banana and peanut on the left and right 
in the morning, at noon and in the afternoon an equal number of times.  This allowed for variation in 
motivation or hunger levels at different times of day as well as controlling for any possible preference 
for one side of the box or the other. 
 
 
3.6 Results 
 
Fig 3.6: following 6 runs of B vs C in the decision box, per rat / per session 
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As shown by fig 3.6, Flavours B and C appear equivalently palatable, with the mean amount of each 
flavour eaten over the habituation period calculated as banana = 0.54g and peanut = 0.62g respectively.  
A matched-pairs t-test demonstrated that there is no significant difference between these means: t9 = -
0.330, sig = 0.749. 
 
 
Additionally there were no consistent individual flavour preferences, with all animals frequently 
switching between both flavours between occasions.  Within each session, in all but 2 of the 60 runs 
only one of the two flavours was consumed, i.e., it was very rare that both flavours were sampled on 
any one occasion, despite the opportunity to do so. 
 
 
3.7 Discussion 
 
The average amounts of B and C eaten in the decision box were not significantly different, and therefore 
it can be taken that these flavours are sufficiently similar in their palatability for SSS to be confidently re-
tested using this more balanced version of the decision box.  It can now be assumed that the animals 
will not consistently choose either one of the flavours over the other, meaning a greater confidence can 
be placed in the results. 
 
It is notable that during any particular session in the decision box an animal only very rarely samples 
both of the flavours, instead tending to select and consume one of either B or C.  This suggests that the 
animals are certain of the flavour choice they are making, as it is very rare for the alternative flavour to 
be sampled after an initial choice is made. 
 
The improved B vs. C flavour pairing in the decision box now allowed for a repeat of this chapter’s first 
experiment in an attempt to demonstrate the presence of SSS in these animals. 
 
 Experiment 3: re-testing SSS 
3.8 Method 
 
 The subjects, apparatus, design and procedure were identical to experiment 1 of the current 
chapter, apart from the altered decision box flavours – now B and C in place of A and B.  The experiment 
ran for a further 6 days, twice a day, as before.  The results were processed in the same way as the first 
experiment, using incongruity scores to assess the extent to which the animals consumed the flavour to 
which they had not just been exposed in context.  Due to the altered decision box flavours, the focus on 
flavours in context also changed in order to maintain congruity and incongruity – the results were 
considered in terms of how much B and C were eaten in the decision after being exposed to flavours B 
and C in context, rather than after flavours A and B in context, as in the previous experiment. 
 
Also, it was decided that if an animal consumed nothing in context, any subsequent flavour choice and 
consumption in the decision box should be excluded from the analysis, as it was considered that any 
such decision box choice could not have been the result of experiencing a previous flavour. 
 
3.9 Results 
 
The incongruity scores were calculated as before, using the incongruous amount eaten in the decision 
box minus the congruous amount, divided by the total amount consumed in the decision box.  As 
before, the positive scores show more incongruous than congruous eating, and hence a tendency 
towards SSS.  Zero demonstrates no preference, i.e., equal amounts of incongruous and congruous 
flavours consumed. 
 
One animal (rat 7) was excluded from the current analysis due to this animal consistently consuming 
nothing in context, meaning that anything consumed subsequently in the decision box could not have 
been the result of satiation to the context’s flavour.  The results for the remaining nine animals are 
shown below in table 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6:  Incongruity scores for each rat showing the extent of each animal’s incongruous eating  
Rat 
 
Incongruity score 
1 0.63 
2 0.44 
3 1.00 
4 0.30 
5 0.11 
6 0.56 
8 0.50 
9 0.24 
10 0.56 
Average 0.50 
 
As shown by the above table, on average the group have an incongruity score of 0.50.  This is 
significantly greater than the average score that would be obtained by chance (zero) if all animals were 
impervious to the different flavours and ate equal amounts of each and obtained a score of zero 
(matched-pairs t-test): t8= -5.597, sig < 0.05.  It is also possible, due to this calculation, to assess the 
individual scores of each animal – as can be seen from the above table, every animal has a positive 
incongruity score (as opposed to when chocolate and banana were paired previously, which resulted in 
several animals with negative scores) and 6 of the 9 animals have a score of near or above the significant 
average of 0.5. 
 
 
 
3.10 Discussion 
 
Following the change to a decision box offering a B versus C flavour choice there is evidence for the 
group showing above chance incongruity scores.  This means that following exposure to flavour B or C in 
context, the animals show a tendency to eat a significantly larger proportion of the incongruous flavour 
when subsequently placed in the decision box with a B/C flavour choice.  For example, an animal 
exposed to flavour B in context then eats a greater proportion of flavour C when subsequently placed in 
the decision box, and vice versa, i.e. the current group of animals demonstrate SSS, in line with previous 
studies that have demonstrated this ability in rats (Rolls et al 1983) This final, significant result for SSS 
was the result of altering the flavour choices in the decision box such that both flavours were similarly 
palatable.  This ensured that the animals lacked a B/C preference and so the choice made in the decision 
box could be put down to an animal’s previous experience of a particular flavour in context.  This result 
also confirmed that these animals can discriminate between the decision box flavours as they choose 
one preferentially over the other. 
 
As a result, the present study can now investigate anticipatory SSS.  This will require the animals to 
demonstrate the same significant preference for the incongruous flavour choice in the decision box, but 
prior to any exposure to a satiating flavour. 
 
Choosing the alternative flavour prior to the satiation is a behaviour that only makes sense if the animal 
is anticipating the upcoming satiation, as both flavours are equally palatable and therefore there is no 
reason for one flavour to be preferred over the other, unless the future experience is taken into 
account.  To ensure that this remains the case it is important that the animals anticipate the upcoming 
satiation yet do not anticipate the flavour choice they offered prior to it.  Several studies of both 
memory (Schwartz et al 2005) and future planning (Emery et al 2001) in nonhumans have allowed the 
possibility that crucial decisions were made in advance and stored as semantic knowledge, then utilised 
as such when the animal is presented with a choice.  This does not allow for a spontaneous ‘on the spot’ 
decision because semantic rather than flexible episodic mechanisms are being utilised (Zentall 2005).  In 
this study an advanced choice would also present a practical problem:  An important aspect of the 
methodology is that any flavour choice is offered in a neutral environment (the decision box) as opposed 
to in a context, which ensures that flavour decisions are not influenced by the surrounding environment. 
An animal expecting an upcoming choice may make the decision in advance, before being placed into 
the neutral decision box and therefore while still in context.  As every context is associated with a 
certain flavour this introduces the possibility that a flavour choice would be made based on that present 
association rather than genuine anticipation of a future context or flavour.  It has been demonstrated 
that an association between a specific location and a specific food increases consumption of that food in 
that location (Petrovich, Ross, Gallagher & Holland, 2007). 
 
Therefore it is necessary to train the animals to anticipate exposure to a certain flavour, but surprise 
them with an unexpected flavour choice before they are exposed to this anticipated flavour.  This means 
any decision made in the decision box will have been made on the spur of the moment and influenced 
only by the animal’s anticipation of the upcoming satiating flavour. 
 
If under these circumstances the rats can demonstrate the ability to choose the ‘incongruous’ flavour as 
they did above, it would be in anticipation of satiation which has not yet occurred.  They would 
therefore be showing ability akin to future planning.  The rats would be acting presently, but motivated 
only by the anticipation of a future state rather than any state currently being experienced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Establishing anticipatory SSS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter it was successfully demonstrated that the current group of animals display 
eating behaviour in line with SSS (Rolls, 2005).  This means that these animals eat to satiation when 
exposed to 2g of flavoured pellets for five minutes, and then when subsequently offered a choice 
between this same flavour and an alternative, they consume a significantly greater proportion of the 
alternative flavour.  This reduction in pleasantness with continued consumption of any foodstuff is a 
robust phenomenon that aids in the consumption of a varied diet – to the extent that an excessively 
varied diet contributes to obesity in rats, as demonstrated by Rolls, Duijenvoorde & Rowe (1983).  The 
current chapter aims to establish whether the current animals can demonstrate anticipatory SSS, i.e., 
whether they can be trained to expect exposure to a certain context and hence anticipate satiation by 
the context’s associated flavour.  If this is the case, when offered a flavour choice prior to this expected 
satiation, the animals should consume more of the flavour that they are not expecting (the incongruous 
flavour), ensuring that the pleasantness of the anticipated flavour remains undiminished in preparation 
for the animal’s exposure to it.  A similar method has been utilised to test for future planning ability in 
scrub jays – Correia, Dickinson & Clayton (2007) demonstrated that jays would choose to go against 
their natural urges and cache a foodstuff to which they were entirely satiated, in preparation for 
retrieving the cache, which would occur after satiation by a different foodstuff (hence the original 
cached food would be renewed in pleasantness).  An important aspect of this study was that it was not a 
repeated procedure, such that the birds could not ‘learn’ from many trial-and-error experiences which 
food would be most rewarding to cache.  After several training trials, there was only 1 testing trial, 
demonstrating a spontaneous ability to consider a future state of satiety.  This spontaneity is equivalent 
to one of the criteria put forward by Griffiths, Dickinson & Clayton (1999) for the testing of nonhuman 
episodic memory.  It was considered that this spontaneity (in response to a ‘one off’ test) was required 
in order to show that an animal was genuinely recalling an episode, rather than simply displaying 
‘knowledge’ of a repeated procedure.  The same criterion applies for envisaging future occasions 
(Correia et al, 2007).  An important aspect of the present study is that the flavour choice offered to the 
animals is infrequent, rendering the choice unexpected and requiring a spontaneous response based on 
genuine anticipation.  Zentall (2006) particularly emphasised the importance of an unexpected choice 
when investigating nonhuman mental time travel, be is retrospective or prospective.  He cites the 
example of asking someone what they had for breakfast.  If this question was unexpected, a person 
would have to actively recall what it was they had eaten.  If that person had been asked the same 
question for many days then the memory of breakfast may instead be stored as semantic knowledge – 
i.e., they just ‘know’ they had eggs on toast, and no active recall of the actual event is necessary.  This 
applies to nonhuman studies as well, in that an animal’s expectation of an upcoming choice or test 
introduces the possibility that any response is not based on genuine recall or forward planning, but 
semantic ‘knowledge’ of what the right answer is.  As long as the flavour choice in the present study is 
unexpected, an incongruous flavour choice would demonstrate an ability to act in a way that serves the 
animals’ future rather than present needs, i.e., by choosing to consume more of the flavour that is not 
going to be consumed in the near future, thus helping to maintain the pleasantness of the upcoming 
flavour and therefore ensuring that consuming this flavour is rewarding.  There would be no reason for 
the rats to choose this incongruous flavour unless engaging in some kind of planning ability that 
acknowledged the flavour to which they would soon be exposed; this is because the flavours used in the 
study are equivalently palatable, and it has been established already that the animals do not hold 
individual flavour preferences. Therefore a successful demonstration here of anticipatory SSS would 
provide strong evidence that these animals are making a choice in the present that only makes logical 
sense if a future situation is being considered.   
 
The animals therefore first had to be trained to anticipate a certain flavour (training phase).  The 
simplest way to achieve this was to teach the animals to expect exposure to a certain context.  The 
contexts had been paired with certain flavours since the earliest days of the study and therefore 
anticipation of a context could also be taken as anticipation of the context’s associated flavour. 
 
The animals were trained to anticipate a context by repeatedly exposing them to an identical sequence 
of contexts, such that after a high number of repetitions the animals will come to anticipate the next 
step in the sequence.  It is at this point, when the animal is anticipating a subsequent context (and 
associated flavour), that the prior-choice would be presented (the test phase).  
 
No study has yet demonstrated this forward planning ability in rats, or in any species other than Correia, 
Dickinson & Clayton’s (2007) scrub jays, a species which has a natural proclivity to cache food with the 
intention of later retrieving it.  This instinctive tendency may aid the birds’ ability to make such decisions 
with the future in mind.  A demonstration of this ability in a different species would be hugely important 
with respect to developing animal models of the kinds of human conditions that result in the 
degeneration of these abilities of memory and future planning, such as Amnesia (Rosenbaum, Koler, 
Schacter, Moscovitch, Westmacott, Black, Gao, Tulving, 2005; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 
2007) and Alzheimer’s disease (Collie & Maruff, 2000; McKhann, Drachman, Folstein, Katzman, Price & 
Stadlan, 1984). 
 
 
4.2 Method - training 
 
As aforementioned, this part of the study is split into 1) training and 2) test phases.  The subjects and 
apparatus remained as in previous chapters. 
 
4.2a TRAINING design 
 
The training phase involved moving the animals between the contexts and decision box in a consistent 
order, such that the animals would become accustomed to this order and come to expect it.  There were 
two kinds of training sequence through the animals were consistently moved, 1) Context runs - featuring 
either context A, B or C - or 2) Decision Box runs.  Context runs involved a particular context and the 
decision box, but Decision Box runs involve the decision box only. 
 
 
 
A Context run occurred as below: 
 
 
 
A rat is placed into an empty context for 5 minutes.  The rat is then transferred to the empty decision 
box for 5 minutes.  Meanwhile the appropriately flavoured food is added to the original context, such 
that when the animal is returned to the context, the associated flavour is present.  After 5 minutes 
exposure to the context and flavour the animal has completed its run and is returned to its home cage.  
The above sequence comprised one ‘run’.  If a run featured context A this was an ‘A run’, context B a ‘B 
run’ etc.  The context that an animal was initially exposed to was always the context to which the animal 
was returned after the decision box.  Training the animals to this sequence served a number of 
purposes: 
 
5 min in 
empty 
context ‘X’ 
Returned to same context 
‘X’ with appropriate flavour 
for 5 min 
5 min in 
empty 
decision 
box 
1. The animal learned that the context to which it was first exposed was the same one to which it 
would be returned later, hence laying the groundwork for anticipating the return to any 
particular context 
2. The animal learned to expect food (and of the appropriate flavour) on its return to the context 
3. The animal became accustomed to being in the decision box immediately before its return to 
the anticipated context and flavour.  This was important as during the test phase it would be 
while in the decision box that the animal is presented with the prior-choice.  The animal must 
therefore feel comfortable in this enclosure and repeated exposure to it within this sequence 
will ensure that is the case. 
 
 
A Decision Box run occurred as below: 
 
The animal was placed in the decision box which contained flavours B and C.  The animal remained in 
this environment for 5 minutes before it was removed and returned to the home cage. 
B versus C 
flavour 
choice 
(5 min) 
 It is necessary that the animal is not only familiar with an empty decision box but also a decision box 
containing a flavour choice, as will occur during the later test phase.  Therefore it is important that an 
animal is exposed just to the decision box containing a B vs. C flavour choice, as detailed above.  It 
should be emphasised here that during Decision Box runs it is exclusively the decision box that is 
experienced, i.e., no context is experienced before or after.    This is because an animal must not 
associate any context with a subsequent food choice in the decision box.  In the later test phase an 
animal will be given an unexpected prior-choice after exposure to a context, however it is imperative 
that an animal does not become trained to this particular sequence.  When an animal is offered a food 
choice it must be unexpected.  If training runs were to combine contexts and flavour choices the animal 
may come to expect making a flavour choice. 
 
Each animal experienced the training runs in a consistent order, such that after every 4 runs each rat 
had experienced 1A, 1B, 1C and 1 Decision Box run.  This ensured that each animal was regularly 
exposed to every alternative, and that the animals became accustomed to making an occasional flavour 
choice in the decision box, though, crucially, not consistently, and not after having experienced any of 
the contexts. 
 
The rats experienced three runs a day (morning, midday and afternoon) up to a total of 40 training runs.  
This meant 10 A runs, 10 B runs, 10 C runs and 10 Decision Box (D) runs.  Five of the decision box runs 
had B against the outside and C against the inside wall of the area, and five vice versa to counterbalance 
any possible preferences of position within the context.  
4.2b Procedure of training 
Training followed a schedule, a sample of which is given below: 
Table 4.1: Example of training schedule for all rats showing the contexts to which they were exposed, for the first 4 
raining runs 
Rat DAY 1 
 
Day 2 
Run 1 
(morning) 
Run 2 
(midday) 
 
Run 3 
(afternoon) 
Run 4 
(morning) 
Run 5 
(midday) 
 
1 A B C D  
 
 
 
 
 
 
…etc 
2 B C D A 
3 C D A B 
4 D A B C 
5 A B C D 
6 B C D A 
7 C D A B 
8 D A B C 
9 A B C D 
10 B C D A 
 
Each rat’s individual schedule meant that several rats could run at the same time (for instance, training 
run 1 above could include rats 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the apparatus simultaneously as these animals’ runs all 
involve different contexts).  However only cage mates were ever tested simultaneously and no context 
was visible or accessible from any other.  Whenever animals were tested simultaneously like this, their 
start times were staggered by five minutes to prevent more than one rat being required in the decision 
box at the same time.  None of the animals appeared distracted by any activity happening 
simultaneously in other contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2: Part of training schedule for cage 1, run 1, demonstrating the movements of rats 1 – 4 across 5 minute 
blocks.  The shaded boxes show when an animal was in the decision box, to demonstrate that due to the staggered 
start times, only one animal was ever required in this area at any one time. 
Rat 0-5min 5-10min 10-15min 15-20min 
1 Empty context A Empty Decision 
Box 
Context A + 
flavour A 
 
2  Empty Context B Empty Decision 
Box 
Context B + 
flavour B 
3   Empty Context C Empty Decision 
Box… 
4 Decision box + 
B/C flavour choice 
   
The rats were moved between the contexts and decision box as in Fig. 4.2 above.  Rats always followed 
food trays into any context.  All activity was filmed and all amounts of every flavour eaten were 
recorded. 
 
4.3 Results of training 
 
As this period was one of training there were limited results to report at this stage, apart from 
monitoring the amount of different favours eaten in context and decision box, to ensure strong 
preferences were not being developed 
Fig 4.3: Mean amounts of flavours B and C eaten in per rat / per session in the decision box 
 
 
As shown by fig 4.3, on average 0.62g of B and 0.34g of C was consumed per occasion in the decision 
box.  A matched-pairs t-test showed that these means were not significantly different: T9 = 2.231, sig = 
0.053 i.e., the two flavours were consumed relatively equivalently in the decision box here.  It should be 
noted of course that this result is close to the significance threshold of 0.05, therefore the amounts of 
these flavours consumed will be monitored throughout the next stage of the study.  The amounts of B 
and C consumed in context are shown below in fig 4.4. 
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Fig 4.4: Mean amounts of flavours B and C eaten per occasion in context, per rat / per session 
 
 
The mean amounts of B and C eaten in context (only one flavour present) were 1.15g and 1.07g 
respectively, shown above in fig 4.4.  These means were not significantly different: T9 = 0.585, sig = 
0.150 (matched-pairs t-test) therefore when taken in isolation the rats do not show a significant 
preference for either of the flavours. 
 
In order to establish whether there was an overall flavour preference at this point, the average amounts 
of each flavour consumed in context and the decision box were combined, to give an average amount of 
each flavour consumed per rat, per training ‘run’.  As shown in fig 4.5 below, the average amount of B 
consumed was 1.77g and average amount of C 1.39g.  A matched-pairs t-test demonstrated these 
means were not significantly different: T9 = 1.781, sig = 0.109. 
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Fig 4.5: Mean amounts of flavours B and C eaten in context and decision box combined, per rat / per training run 
 
 
 
4.4 Discussion of training 
 
Observation of the animals made it apparent that they became more comfortable with the training 
procedure as time went on.  After a short number of trials the animals showed far fewer occasions of 
stressful behaviours such as freezing, running in short frantic bursts and urination in the enclosure – all 
cited by Rodgers & Dalvi (1997) as indications of anxiety in the rat.  Instead the animals showed interest 
in their surroundings with slow exploration of the walls and floor, standing on their hind legs and 
appearing unaffected by any unexpected noise. 
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Looking at the mean amounts of B (banana) and C (peanut) consumed in the decision box, there was no 
significant difference in the consumption of the two flavours when given this choice, with the group 
consuming relatively similar amounts of each flavour.  When considering the mean amount consumed of 
the same two flavours when in the associated contexts, there was also no significant difference here.  To 
assess overall flavour preference, the total amount of each flavour consumed per rat, per training run 
(i.e. both in context and the decision box) was compared.  A non-significant result here shows the 
animals on average do not prefer one flavour over the other.  This is a positive result as it should ensure 
that any change in consumption is motivated by satiety-based anticipation, rather than a baseline 
flavour preference. 
 
If these animals are capable of anticipatory SSS, in the testing trials to follow they will make a decision 
box B/C flavour choice based on the flavour they are expecting to experience.  A rat demonstrating a 
future planning ability would for instance choose flavour B in the decision box if it had previously been 
exposed to an empty context C, in anticipation of the opportunity to soon become satiated by 
associated flavour C when returned to this context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Method – testing 
 
4.5a Design 
 
The design remained almost identical to the training runs above.  The animals were rotated through the 
same three runs a day, each rat still consistently rotated through A, B, C and D runs as before: 
 
 
 
 
The main alteration to the procedure was the introduction of critical tests every nine runs, such that the 
first, ninth, eighteenth, twenty-seventh, thirty-sixth and forty-second run for each rat was a critical run.  
All other runs were ‘fillers’, and occurred just as the training trials. 
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During a critical test an animal would experience an A, B or C run just as in training, though with the 
addition of an unexpected prior-choice present in the decision box, as below: 
 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that, in the mornings, animals ate significantly greater amounts of 
the food to which they were first exposed, compared to that experienced subsequently.  In the case of 
critical testing trials (as seen in the diagram above), the first ‘food’ experienced by an animal would be 
the flavour choice in the decision box.  While the difference between the amount of food consumed in 
the decision box and that consumed on return to context is not a critical one here, the result in the 
previous chapter suggested an initial eagerness towards the first food experienced that was considered 
useful to exploit during the training trials.  To take full advantage of this, all critical trials would be 
carried out in the morning. 
 
It would be during these critical tests that the animals’ future planning abilities would be assessed.  The 
unexpected B/C flavour choice was only offered every 9 trials to ensure the rats would not come to 
predict its occurrence.  It was essential that the animals did not expect having to make a choice until 
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they were in the neutral decision box.  An expected test would be problematic for two reasons.  The first 
is that it may result in the animal choosing which flavour to eat whilst still in the empty context.  While 
this could be considered an example of forward planning it itself, it actually means that the flavour 
choice would be considered and/or made whilst in an environment associated with a certain flavour.  
This means the choice would be based on a state presently being experienced by the animal rather than 
an anticipated future state, and therefore could not be considered an example of true future planning.  
The second problem with a regular and therefore expected test was the potential for the rats to learn to 
choose the incongruous flavour based on becoming familiar with the increased or decreased 
pleasantness of the subsequent context-flavour.  It was important that each critical test could be 
considered in isolation of any context so that any incongruous eating could be attributed to genuine 
flexible planning and not simple reinforcement.  While in the empty context the rat should anticipate 
the opportunity to later become satiated by the context’s associated flavour, but should not be 
expecting the decision box choice.  It is only when the animal is in a truly neutral context that it can then 
make a flavour decision based entirely on the anticipation of a future state of satiation. 
 
 4.5b Procedure 
 
On a filler run, i.e., when there was going to be no unexpected flavour choice in the decision box, the 
animals were rotated through the contexts in an A-run, B-run, C-run, D-run pattern exactly as in the 
training runs.  On a critical run, none of the animals experienced a D-run, as all would experience an 
unexpected flavour choice in the decision box on these occasions. 
Fig. 4.6: Part of testing schedule for cage 1 on its first critical run, demonstrating the movements of rats 1 – 4 
across 5 minute blocks.  The grey boxes show when an animal was in the decision box 
 
Rat 0-5min 5-10min 10-15min 15-20min 20-25min 
1 Empty context 
A 
Decision Box + 
food choice 
Context A + 
flavour A 
  
2  Empty Context 
B 
Decision Box + 
food choice 
Context B + 
flavour B 
 
3   Empty Context 
C 
Decision Box 
+ food 
choice 
Context C + 
flavour C 
4    Empty 
Context A 
Decision Box 
+ food 
choice 
 
As demonstrated by figure 4.6 above, on the first training trial rat 1 was placed in empty context A for 
five minutes, and then transferred to the empty decision box as rat 2 was placed in empty context B.  
After five minutes rat 1 was returned to context A, now containing pellets of flavour A, while rat 2 was 
moved to the empty decision box and rat 3 placed in empty context C, etc.  Rat 4 was placed straight 
into the decision box whenever it was unoccupied for five minutes, with a B versus C flavour choice.  The 
following training session would run identically, although starting with rat 1 in empty context B, etc.  In 
this way each cage of rats was rotated throughout a consistent sequence of empty context > empty 
decision box > context + food.  Rats always followed food trays into any context.  All activity was filmed 
and all amounts of every flavour eaten were recorded. 
There were six critical tests for each rat, meaning each animal experienced 2 critical A runs, 2 critical B 
runs and 2 critical C runs to ensure equal experience of all alternatives.  The position of the B and C food 
trays in the decision box were counterbalanced to ensure equal experience of each flavour on the left 
and right. 
 
 
4.6 Results of testing 
 
As mentioned previously, the average amounts of B and C consumed in context and in the decision box 
were calculated in order to check for a flavour preference.  Fig 4.7 below shows the average amounts of 
each flavour consumed in context. 
 
Fig 4.7: Average amounts of flavours B and C consumed in context per rat / per session 
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 As can be seen from fig 4.7 above, the average amount of B and C consumed in context across the 
testing trials is very similar: B (banana) = 1.62g, C (peanut) = 1.65g.  These means are not significantly 
different (matched-pairs t-test): t9 = -0.555, sig = 0.59.  The average amounts consumed in the decision 
box were also examined, shown below in fig 4.8. 
Fig 4.8: Graph demonstrating the average amounts of flavours B and C consumed in the decision box, per rat / per 
session  
 
Fig 4.8 (using the same axis as previous fig 4.7, for comparison) shows that per occasion in the decision 
box, each rat consumed an average amount of 0.61g of banana and 0.40g of peanut flavour.  These 
means were not significantly different (matched-pairs t-test): t9 = 1.137, sig = 0.29. 
 
In order to establish whether the animals displayed a flavour preference during the testing trials, the 
average amount of banana and peanut consumed per rat, per testing ‘run’ (i.e. the combined amount 
consumed in context and in the decision box) was calculated.  The results are shown in fig 4.9 below.  On 
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average, each animal consumed 2.23g banana and 2.05g peanut.  A matched pairs t-test demonstrated 
these means were not significantly different: t9 = 0.841, sig = 0.422.  This shows an absence of a flavour 
preference during the testing trials. 
 
 
 
Fig 4.9: Graph showing the average combined amounts of flavours B and C consumed in the decision box and in 
context, per rat / per testing run 
 
 
Critical test data 
The critical test data were processed in much the same way as the ‘normal’ SSS data -that is, using 
incongruity scores.  If the animals demonstrated anticipatory SSS, they would choose to eat the decision 
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box flavour to which they were not expecting to be subsequently exposed.  For instance a rat on a 
critical B run would placed in empty context B for 5 minutes and would enter the neutral decision box 
expecting firstly an empty decision box and secondly that flavour B will soon be readily available, as had 
been consistently the case for many weeks of training.  The decision box would in fact unexpectedly 
contain flavours B and C.  A rat successfully planning for the future would choose to eat incongruously, 
i.e., here would favour flavour C over flavour B, anticipating the opportunity to eat flavour B to satiation 
later. 
 
The more positive the incongruity scores, the greater the tendency of the animals to eat the flavour they 
are not expecting, suggesting a future planning ability.  The results for each rat and the group average 
are shown in table 4.9 below. 
 
Table 4.9: Incongruity scores for each rat, averaged across six critical test runs 
 
Rat 
 
Incongruity score 
1 -0.026 
2 -0.333 
3 -0.236 
4 -0.208 
5 -1.000 
6 -0.046 
7 0.250 
8 0.000 
9 -0.166 
10 -0.154 
Average -0.192 
 
 
A matched-pairs t-test was conducted on the above data as previously, comparing the average score 
with the zero score that would have occurred if all animals had eaten identical amounts of the 
congruous and incongruous flavour.  The t-test showed that the average incongruity score above (-
0.192) is not significantly different from the average zero in either a positive or negative direction: t9 = 
1.860, sig = 0.096, i.e., the average score is not significantly different from that which would be obtained 
if the animals on average showed no preference for either the congruous or incongruous flavour in the 
decision box.  This group mean therefore does not support the hypothesis that the animals consumed 
the incongruous significantly more than the congruous flavour, and does not suggest that these animals 
are capable of future planning.  Looking at the individual scores in the table above it appears that most 
are negative and fairly close to zero, meaning that at an individual level there does not appear to be a 
tendency to eat either congruously or incongruously. 
 
 Fig 4.10: Graph demonstrating the average group incongruity scores for SSS and anticipatory SSS 
 
The red horizontal lines on fig 4.10 above show the threshold scores necessary for statistical significance 
to be achieved, i.e., an incongruity score of plus or minus 0.226 would mean that the score was 
significantly different from zero using a one-sample t-test.  As seen in graph 4.10 above, when assessing 
SSS the incongruity score calculated fell above this threshold (in fact reaching 0.5), meaning that the 
animals consumed significantly greater amounts of the incongruous as compared to the congruous 
flavour, thus demonstrating SSS.  The incongruity score obtained from the experiment to establish 
anticipatory SSS was -0.192.  As seen from graph 4.10 this score fell between the upper and lower 
threshold levels meaning neither the congruous nor the incongruous flavour was consumed significantly 
more.  
 
As shown in fig 4.9, the average amounts of B and C consumed per rat, per testing run (i.e. the amount 
in context and in the decision box combined) during these testing trials were not significantly different.  
Therefore it can be taken that (as opposed to the first SSS result in chapter three) a lack of significance in 
the anticipatory SSS test here is not due to a flavour preference.  It was therefore decided to look at the 
amount eaten in context following congruous and incongruous eating in the decision box (for the critical 
trials in which there was an unexpected flavour choice in the decision box).  This information may be 
useful as it should be this return to context (and its associated flavour) that the animals are anticipating 
when a choice is made in the decision box, therefore looking at the amount eaten here may provide an 
insight into the reasons for the animals’ lack of anticipatory SSS. 
 
Table 4.11 below shows the average amount of food consumed in context following a critical test in the 
decision box.  The middle column shows the amount of food consumed following an incongruous food 
choice in the decision box and the right-hand column shows that following a congruous flavour choice 
(i.e., only food consumed in context B or C is included here).  It would be intuitive to expect greater 
amounts to be eaten in context following an incongruous flavour choice, as the purpose of this choice 
would be to maintain the pleasantness of the upcoming context-flavour, in order that this flavour would 
be more pleasant to eat.  However this was not the case, as shown below. 
 
Table 4.11: Mean amounts consumed by each animal in context, following either an incongruous or a congruous 
choice in the decision box during critical testing days 
 
Rat 
 
Mean amount consumed 
in context after 
incongruous eating in 
decision box 
Mean amount consumed 
in context after 
congruous eating in 
decision box 
1 
0.15 0.2 
2 
0 0.4 
3 
0 0.6 
4 
0 0.53 
5 
0 0.05 
6 
0.13 0.2 
7 
0 0 
8 
0.95 1.3 
9 
0 0.133 
10 
0 0.05 
Average 
0.12 0.35 
 
A matched-pairs t-test on the data in table 4.11 showed that on average the animals consumed a 
significantly greater amount of food on return to context if they had previously eaten congruously in the 
decision box (0.35g subsequently eaten in context on average) than if they had eaten incongruously 
(0.12g subsequently eaten in context on average): t9 = -3.141, sig < 0.012.  While it is merely anecdotal, 
it is interesting to consider the numbers of congruous and incongruous eating occasions across the 
testing trials: there were 40 critical runs on which it was possible to make a strictly congruous or 
incongruous choice in the decision box, i.e., on B and C runs (on the 20 A runs, both of the flavour 
choices in the decision box are ‘incongruous’ compared to flavour A).  Of these 40 B and C runs, only 14 
resulted in incongruous choices.  Coupled with the 9 occasions of eating nothing when returned to 
context, this means there were just 5 occasions out of a possible 40 in which an animal made an 
incongruous flavour choice in the decision box and then went on to eat the supposed ‘anticipated’ 
flavour when returned to context.  This is the behaviour that would be required to demonstrate 
nonhuman anticipation, and the rarity of such behaviour does not provide support for a planning ability 
in this group of animals as assessed by this method. 
 
4.7 Discussion of testing 
 
Relative amounts of congruous / incongruous flavour consumed in decision box 
 
The average incongruity score calculated earlier in this chapter was not significantly different from zero, 
meaning that on critical trials relatively equivalent proportions of the congruous and the incongruous 
flavour were consumed.  This means anticipatory SSS did not occur and means the current group of 
animals did not demonstrate an ability to plan for the future, which should have resulted in greater 
amounts of the incongruous flavour being consumed in the decision box in order to maintain the 
pleasantness of the anticipated context flavour.  This is based on the assumption that consuming a 
certain flavour makes it subsequently more pleasant to consume an alternative – indeed this (SSS) was 
demonstrated by the current group of animals in the previous chapter, when a higher proportion of the 
incongruous than the congruous flavour was consumed in the decision box following exposure to a 
certain context, and that context’s associated flavour.  It may merely be the future planning aspect of 
the current procedure which results in difficulty for this group of animals, or there may be other reasons 
for the lack of a significant result.  Other findings will now be discussed in an attempt to understand the 
animals’ behaviour. 
 
Returning to context: Amount eaten following congruous/incongruous eating in the decision box 
 
If an animal was capable of or inclined towards future planning in the form of anticipatory SSS, it could 
be assumed that the animal would consume more food on its return to context if it had previously eaten 
incongruously in the decision box.  Congruous decision box eating could be considered to have satiated 
the rat to the flavour to which it is then exposed in context, resulting in a smaller amount being eaten 
due to the now reduced pleasantness of this flavour, in line with SSS (Rolls, 2005).  However the 
opposite occurred in the current study.  On average, an animal that made a congruous choice in the 
decision box then ate a larger amount when subsequently returned to context than when an 
incongruous choice had been made in the decision box.  This result is unexpected in terms of the SSS 
literature (Rolls, 2005; Johnson & Vickers, 1992, Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1982, 1982), which shows that the 
perceived pleasantness of a certain flavour is reduced with continued consumption.  The current results 
suggest that even if the animals are capable of anticipating the upcoming flavour (and there is no 
evidence of this ability), there appears to be insufficient incentive for them to demonstrate this planning 
ability by eating incongruously in the decision box, since when incongruous eating occurs it appears the 
animals are less inclined to eat when returned to context. The fact that a congruous choice in the 
decision box does not deter the animals from continuing to eat this flavor on return to context suggests 
the animals have not been satiated by the amounts of food and timeframes allowed here. 
 
This may seem at odds with the positive SSS result in chapter 3, which did demonstrate the occurrence 
of this characteristic reduction in pleasantness following consumption of a certain flavour.  However this 
previous positive result need not have required ‘true’ satiation; a novelty-based flavour preference 
would have obtained the same result.  Anticipatory SSS would have first required genuine satiety to be 
reached if the animals were to behave in response to an anticipation of this state.  The rats varied in the 
amounts of food consumed, some eating the entire 2g presented and some less.  In either case it is 
possible that genuine satiety may not have been achieved.  The smaller amounts eaten may have been 
the result of the rats’ ad libertum access to food throughout the period of the study.  The literature on 
which this study’s SSS theory was based often involved animals that were on a reduced diet, which 
increased the incentive to eat to satiation when they were allowed access to certain test flavours.  The 
current animals may have never been entirely satiated by any of the flavours due to a lack of this kind of 
hunger drive.  If this is the case they may still be capable of anticipating a future flavour, just not 
motivated sufficiently by an anticipated satiety to show a preference for the incongruous flavour in the 
decision box. 
 
 
 
 
 
Returning to context: eating nothing 
 
As aforementioned, in the present study, a rat successfully planning for the future would have eaten the 
alternative (incongruous) flavour in the decision box in order that it would not become satiated by the 
upcoming context flavour, such that when subsequently exposed to this flavour, its pleasantness would 
not have diminished and the rat would gain more enjoyment from consuming it.  It seems 
counterproductive, then, that on over half of the occasions on which the incongruous flavour was 
selected in the decision box, the animal ate nothing at all when returned to the “anticipated” context. 
 
One possible explanation may be that the animals were ‘satiated’ by food in general in the decision box, 
such that on return to context no further food is consumed.  However evidence from critical trials in 
which animals ate the congruous flavour shows that this cannot be the case: following congruous eating 
in the decision box the animals are likely to eat more when returned to context than following 
incongruous eating, despite being returned to a flavour identical to that just consumed.  It was therefore 
unlikely that the animals were actively anticipating the correct flavour even when they made an 
incongruous choice in the decision box, due to many of them failing to capitalise on their ‘correct’ choice 
by eating the supposedly anticipated flavour on return to context.  This negative result is somewhat 
confirmed by the very few occasions on which an incongruous choice was followed by continued eating 
in context.  A true planning capability would have resulted in more of such occasions. 
 
Consistent incongruity did not occur, meaning a planning ability cannot be assumed in these animals.  
However it would be interesting to know if a rat could be capable of learning to consistently choose the 
incongruous choice if exposed to critical trials much more frequently.  An animal repeatedly exposed 
only to critical runs may start to assimilate information across continuing trials and learn that eating 
incongruously in the decision box would mean the subsequent context-flavour is more pleasant to eat (it 
should be, based on these animals’ previous demonstration of SSS).  An ability to learn this kind of 
future planning would still be an asset in a laboratory animal; consistently positive results may mean 
that exploratory surgery could investigate the processes involved in learning this complex cognitive 
activity.  This may be similar to a young child’s ability to learn to plan for his own personal future, or the 
possible re-learning experienced by someone affected by amnesia. 
 
The final part of this investigation therefore centres on a ‘learning test’ to establish whether the current 
ten rats can learn to eat incongruously.  Alternatively the case may be that the animals learn to eat 
congruously to an even greater extent, if this congruous behaviour produces a pleasant result for them.  
If learning is successful it would be expected that the group’s average incongruity score would either 
drift in a substantially positive or negative direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.8 Method - learning 
 
The subjects and apparatus remained as above. 
 
 4.8a Design of learning test 
 
The animals’ ability to learn to anticipate flavours was assessed by altering the previous procedure such 
that now every run an animal experienced would be a critical run - i.e., a rat would be presented with a 
flavour choice every time it was placed in the decision box.  In this way the flavour choice is no longer 
unexpected, and therefore the animals will begin to associate the now consistent choice in the decision 
box with their subsequent experience of being returned to context.  Following repetitions an animal may 
alter its eating behaviour to take this new pattern into account.  An animal may learn to choose the 
alternative flavour in the decision box based on the consistently repeated experience of making this 
choice and then being returned to context.  After several trials an animal may associate the incongruous 
flavour in the decision box with being subsequently exposed to a flavour different to that which has just 
been consumed, which makes this second flavour more pleasant to eat. 
 
The rats experienced one learning run every morning for 15 mornings, making 15 runs in total such that 
five A, five B and five C learning runs were included in each rat’s schedule.  There were no runs that 
featured only the decision box as there had been before, as the animals were now exposed to a decision 
box choice every day, therefore it was considered that they did not require any further separate 
habituation to this environment. 
 
 4.8b Procedure of learning test 
 
The procedure remained identical to the critical test runs described above, i.e., a rat would be placed in, 
for example, empty context B for five minutes, then transferred to the decision box in which there 
would be a B versus C flavour choice.   Five minutes later the animal would be returned to the original 
context B which now contained pellets of flavour B (now considered a ‘B learning run’).    All behaviour 
was recorded with the same camera set up as in previous experiments, and all food eaten was recorded, 
also as before. 
 
4.9 Results of learning test 
 
If the repeated procedure allowed the animals to associate choosing the incongruous flavour in the 
decision box with a more pleasant eating experience when returned to context, it would be expected 
that the animals would eat more incongruously than congruously in the decision box.  This would result 
in a positive incongruity score, potentially one above the necessary threshold to make the learning 
result significantly different from zero.  If the incongruity score following the learning trials is more 
negative this would demonstrate the congruous flavour was eaten more than the incongruous and could 
suggest the animals are instead associating the congruous flavour with a more pleasant return to 
context.  
The average incongruity scores for each rat are shown and averaged below in table 4.12.  As before, 
positive scores demonstrate incongruous and negative scores congruous eating in the decision box. 
 
Table 4.12 Incongruity scores averaged for rats 1-10, averaged across 15 critical learning test runs 
Rat Incongruity score  
1 -0.495 
2 -0.003 
3 -0.011 
4 0.108 
5 -0.589 
6 0.004 
7 -0.304 
8 -0.104 
9 -0.195 
10 -0.841 
Average -0.243 
 The average incongruity score of the group is -0.243.  This is more negative than the average score of 
the previous experiment (-0.192), and therefore does not demonstrate that these animals are able to 
learn that choosing the incongruous flavour presently ensures a more pleasant eating experience in the 
future. 
 
However this score is significantly negatively different from the average incongruity score of zero that 
would be obtained had the animals shown no preference whatsoever for either the incongruous or the 
congruous flavour (matched-pairs t-test): T9 = 2.483, sig < 0.05.   A comparison is shown on fig 4.13 
below.  The graph also displays red lines at the threshold levels at which an incongruity score would be 
significantly different from a score of zero (0.226 and -0.226).  As the graph shows, the original SSS 
incongruity score (0.5) is significantly greater than zero, showing that on average the animals consumed 
significantly more of the incongruous relative to the congruous flavour.  The average incongruity score 
from the tests of anticipatory SSS (-0.192) was not significantly different from zero.  The incongruity 
score from the tests of learned anticipation was -0.243 and therefore above the threshold shown, 
meaning during these tests the animals consumed on average greater amounts of the congruous 
relative to the incongruous flavour. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.13 the average group incongruity scores for SSS, anticipatory SSS and learned anticipation 
 
 
Therefore in the most recent experiment (the ‘learned anticipation’ bar on the right of fig 4.13 above) 
the animals average incongruity score indicated that as compared to chance, the group as a whole 
consumes a greater proportion of the congruous as compared to the incongruous flavour.  It appears 
then that these animals did respond to the learning trials, however they appeared to learn to associate 
consumption of the congruous flavour in the decision box with a more pleasant subsequent return to 
context.  Possible reasons for this will be explored in the discussion section. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.10 Discussion of learning 
 
In the above learning procedure, animals capable of learning to plan for a future flavour would be 
expected to consume greater proportions of the incongruous over the congruous flavour.  This would 
mean that on return to the anticipated context the animals would have access to a flavour different 
from that which they had just consumed.  It was considered that this would be a more pleasant 
experience than being returned to a context containing a flavour that had been consumed very recently, 
based on the SSS data in chapter 3 of this study, and the large amount of SSS literature that describes 
this reduction in pleasantness following consumption (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1981, 1982; Rolls, 2005; 
Johnson & Vicker, 1992; Bell, Rowe & Rolls, 2003).  Moreover, throughout the learning trials the 
unexpected flavour choice was presented frequently, meaning the animals were able to learn over 
several trials the result of choosing the incongruous flavour in the decision box (subsequently exposed 
to an alternative flavour) and the result of choosing the congruous flavour (subsequently exposed to the 
same flavour).  However over the course of the learning trials the animals consumed a significantly 
greater average proportion of the congruous than the incongruous flavour.  This is counterintuitive as it 
means that an animal is then returned to a context containing the flavour which it has already eaten.  
According to the SSS literature, continued consumption of a particular foodstuff to the point of satiation 
results in its perceived pleasantness reducing relative to other flavours (Raby, Alexis, Dickinson & 
Clayton, 2007) textures and scents (Rolls, 2005), and even colours (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1982).  This could 
suggest that the amounts of pellets eaten in the current study were insufficient to satiate the animals 
during the testing and learning stages, meaning there was no real reduction in perceived pleasantness 
and therefore there was little incentive for the animals to seek out an alternative flavour. 
 
Alternatively it is possible that the animals’ eating behaviour during the learning trials was due to a 
genuine preference for congruous flavour consumption.  Indeed, when testing for anticipatory SSS it was 
found that the animals ate greater quantities on return to context if they had made a congruous choice 
in the decision box.  This suggests that some aspect of consuming the congruous flavour in the decision 
box (i.e., the flavour associated with the empty context which the animal experienced prior to the 
decision box) actually facilitates further consumption of this flavour when returned to the associated 
context – perhaps rather than coming close to satiating the animal, the flavour consumed whilst in the 
decision box actually ‘primes’ the animal to then continue eating the same flavour subsequently - 
perhaps related to the association found by Petrovich, Ross, Gallagher & Holland (in press), whereby an 
animal consumed greater quantities of a particular food while in a location associated with that 
particular food.  If this is the case then it would make sense that this association begins when the animal 
is initially placed in the empty context at the start of its ‘run’:  The location ‘primes’ the animal to eat the 
associated (congruous) flavour in context, which then does not deter the animal from continuing to 
consume this flavour when  returned to context (particularly at this later stage of the study, by which 
time the animals were older and potentially capable of eating larger amounts before they became 
satiated). 
 
4.11 Overall Discussion 
 
Chapter 2 of this study was designed to establish the quantity of food and the timeframe required for 
the current group of rats to become satiated.  This was important as the study was intended to identify 
an ability to anticipate a forthcoming satiation by a specific flavour, and an animal that has never 
experienced satiation could not be expected to anticipate this state.  Despite this effort to investigate 
the necessary criteria for satiety here, there are reasons why the resulting quantities and timeframes 
may not have been sufficient.  Firstly the tests for satiety were carried out at the beginning of the study 
when the animals were younger and smaller.  As the animals grew it is possible that the amounts of food 
initially sufficient to satiate the animals became less so as the rats gained in weight.  The rats’ ages is 
also something to be considered – Rolls & McDermott (1991) showed that adolescent (albeit human) 
subjects were much more susceptible to sensory specific satiety than older participants, i.e., 
consumption of a certain food by younger subjects produced a drop in pleasantness far more marked 
than in elderly participants, who were less likely to report feeling satiated by a certain foodstuff in terms 
of finding it less pleasant to eat; it is possible that as the rats aged throughout the study they 
experienced reduced levels of satiety.  Another consideration is the lack of food deprivation amongst 
the current group of animals.  Most investigations involving SSS require the subjects (human or not) to 
be at least partly food deprived prior to test.  Some methodologies simply involve instructing human 
subjects to eat nothing between their breakfast and their lunchtime testing and then allowing the 
participants to consume as much as they want over a 15 minute period (Johnson & Vickers, 1992).  
Others instruct humans subjects that have eaten nothing since breakfast to consume a designated 
volume of a milk-based meal, in order to investigate the effects of volume and energy density (Bell, Roe 
& Rolls, 2003).  Studies involving nonhuman subjects have induced satiety by allowing subjects 3 hours 
with an excess of a certain foodstuff (scrub jays - Correia, Dickinson & Clayton, 2007), or 20 hours of 
food deprivation followed by an excess of a certain foodstuff for 20-30 minutes (rats - Petrovich, Ross, 
Gallagher & Holland, 2007) or simply ad libertum access to normal ‘home cage food’ for 20 hours in 
order to satiate the animals to this food (rats - same authors).  It is possible that the current animals did 
not experience satiety during the latter stages of the study, which may have rendered the group unable 
to anticipate this state with sufficient salience for it to guide their current behaviour. 
 
Another possibility is that the animals are simply unable to do this task - it is enlightening that the 
learning stage as well as the testing stage was unsuccessful here as this does suggest that these rats 
cannot solve the task in any form, either spontaneously as a result of infrequent, unexpected tests or as 
a result of learning following a repeat procedure.  It is also possible that rats are incapable of engaging in 
future orientated behaviour at all.  It is true that at the time of writing no study has successfully 
demonstrated this kind of future planning in rats: Naqshbandi and Roberts (2006) tested rats and 
monkeys in order to establish if the animals would switch their intrinsic preference for a large pile of 
food to a smaller pile in order to speed the return of a water bottle to their cage.  Crucially at the time of 
choice the animals were not thirsty, therefore success in the task depended on genuine anticipation of 
future state of thirst not currently experienced.  After several trials the monkeys successfully chose the 
smaller pile of food and were rewarded with the swift return of their water bottle.  The rats never 
learned to make this switch however, regardless of the number of trials experienced and the thirst that 
ensued, demonstrating an inability for this species to learn to solve a future planning task.  Another 
study that attempted to establish a future planning ability in rats was McKenzie, Bird & Roberts (2005) 
work with a radial maze.  Rats were allowed to store small pieces of food in the arms of a radial maze, 
and then to retrieve them after a certain period of time.  The experimenters designated certain arms 
‘degrade’ locations, such that any food stored here was inedible by the time the animals came to 
retrieve it.  The rats never learned to avoid storing food in the degrade arms, though the animals did 
stop retrieving food from the degrade locations.  This suggested an ability to remember which arms 
provide inedible food, yet these animals were incapable of using this information during the storing 
event.  This suggests that the rats considered each act in isolation, i.e., did not consider storage to be 
connected in any way to later retrieval.  The animals in the current study suggest a similar behaviour, as 
all but one of the animals alternated frequently between congruous and incongruous eating throughout 
the entire 15 runs.  This suggests that each run was considered in isolation rather than as one of a string 
of related experiences to learn from. 
 
4.11 Summary 
 
In summary, the current group of animals did not display spontaneous future orientated behaviour by 
choosing the incongruous flavour in anticipation of upcoming satiation in response to infrequent and 
therefore unexpected ‘testing’ trials, a behaviour shown by Correia, Dickinson & Clayton’s (2007) jays.  
Neither did the group learn to display such future-orientated behaviour in response to frequently 
repeated ‘learning’ trials, in common with Naqshbandi & Roberts’ (2006) rats.  The learning trials 
resulted in a significantly greater proportion of the congruous flavour being consumed.  The group 
therefore cannot be said to demonstrate anticipatory sensory specific satiety.  While it is possible that 
the animals may have anticipated the upcoming flavour, this is not indisputably demonstrated by the 
behaviour shown, as memory and priming could be equally possible determinants of the behaviour 
shown in the learning trials.  These unsuccessful results may be due to a lack of satiation throughout the 
study, resulting in the animals being unable to genuinely anticipate this state.  Further reasons for this 
result are explored in the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
This study is one of many recent attempts to investigate whether nonhumans, in this case rats, are 
capable of planning for the future, i.e., whether nonhumans can engage in behaviour that is  
entirely future orientated rather than in response to the animals‟ present needs.  In this way it re-
examines Bischoff-Kohler‟s experimental conclusions (cited in Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) 
that animals are “stuck in time” and aware only of their present motivational state.  Tapping into 
genuinely future orientated behaviour requires a careful methodology and design in order to 
ensure that it is not confounded with behaviour that may result from current motivations.  To this 
end, the present study utilises sensory specific satiety (SSS) (Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1981), in 
order to investigate the possibility of anticipatory SSS.  SSS is the phenomenon whereby an 
animal exposed to excessive amounts of, and hence satiated by, a certain foodstuff will 
subsequently find that foodstuff less pleasant compared to alternative foods and will therefore 
select an alternative if offered a choice.  It is a mechanism that promotes variety in the diet.  
Anticipatory SSS would occur if an animal was able to anticipate satiation, i.e., an animal would 
choose to eat a certain foodstuff (e.g., food A) now in order to prepare for an excess of a different 
foodstuff (e.g., B) in the future. 
This ability to anticipate future satiation to a foodstuff was tested in the present group of rats.  
An animal capable of anticipating satiation to flavour A should, if offered a choice in advance, 
preferentially consume greater proportions of flavour B in order to preserve the pleasantness of 
anticipated flavour A – in accordance with the robust and widely established phenomenon of 
SSS.  The use of anticipatory SSS in this study helps to prevent current and future motivated 
behaviour becoming confounded because the incongruous choice holds no present benefit for the 
animals, hence consistently choosing the incongruous flavour must be taken as an indication of 
something other than present drives, thereby demonstrating future planning.  This discussion will 
first consider what has and has not been demonstrated throughout the study; it will then explore 
how the results of the current study relate to other future planning literature.  Finally, reasons for 
lack of success are explored, with possible improvements for future work. 
 
What has and has not been demonstrated by the study 
The study centred on whether or not the animals could anticipate future satiation.  Therefore it 
was first important to establish if the animals would first demonstrate „normal‟ satiation.  In the 
early chapters of the study it was therefore necessary to investigate the conditions that would 
result in satiation in the current group of animals, e.g., timeframes, quantity of food required and 
the optimum flavours to use.  Chapter 2 demonstrated that rats are capable of being satiated by a 
flavour in less than 5 minutes, indeed it was following 3-4 minutes of exposure to a certain 
flavour that the animals began to eat substantially reduced amounts of this flavour, 
demonstrating the characteristic reduction in pleasantness seen across the SSS literature (Rolls, 
2005; Rolls, Rowe & Rolls, 1981;1982; etc).  While human and nonhuman studies may not be 
directly comparable in this case, it is interesting to note that Smeets & Westerterp-Plantenga 
(2006) found that 5 minutes oral exposure to a certain foodstuff was also sufficient for humans to 
show SSS behaviour, i.e., to prefer an alternative foodstuff when subsequently offered a choice.   
It was decided that in the upcoming satiation trials an animal would therefore spend 5 minutes in 
the presence of a satiating flavour. 
 
The experiments in chapter 2 additionally assessed the amount of a certain flavour that was 
necessary and sufficient to satiate the animals during the previously established 5-minute 
timeframe.  In the earliest trials the animals were provided with an excess of 5g of flavoured 
pellets, of which no more than half was ever consumed.  The amount of food eaten was 
measured each day and averaged across the animals.  With repeated exposure across several days 
the animals became habituated to the enclosure and consumed greater average quantities with 
each passing day.  A plateau was reached from day 10 onwards, with the average amount 
consumed at 1.48g within the 5 minute timeframe.  This was the average quantity of food that 
was necessary and sufficient to satiate these animals.  It was decided therefore that a slight 
excess (2g) of food would be provided in subsequent trials in order to satiate the animals to a 
certain flavour. 
Flavour preference was also investigated.  In the initial experimental chapter (chapter 2), three 
flavours of Omnitreat
tm
 pellets were chosen at random (chocolate, tropical and peanut butter) and 
the consumption of each was assessed.  It became apparent that the animals did not like tropical 
flavour, as the amounts consumed were significantly lower than the other flavours.  Tropical 
flavour was therefore replaced with banana, which the animals consumed in much larger 
quantities.  As aforementioned the study required two of the three flavours to be offered as a 
consistent flavour choice.  It was important that these two flavours were equivalently preferable 
to the animals, to ensure that any differential consumption was the result of experimental 
manipulations and not simple flavour preference.  Initially chocolate and banana were paired 
together and formed the standard flavour choice, however it soon became apparent that animals 
substantially preferred banana.  The paired flavour choice was therefore altered to consist of 
banana and peanut flavour pellets, which were more equally palatable and reduced the possibility 
that intrinsic flavour preference would drive eating behaviour. 
In chapter 3 it was established that the current group of animals demonstrate SSS (Rolls, Rowe 
& Rolls, 1981).  This means that following 5 minutes exposure to a certain flavour, e.g., banana, 
when subsequently offered a flavour choice between the flavour just experienced, and an 
alternative (e.g., peanut), the animals on average consume significantly higher proportions of the 
alternative (incongruous) peanut flavour, due to the reduced pleasantness of the banana pellets 
relative to other flavours.   
It was also established that in the mornings, the animals ate greater amounts of the food first 
experienced than the food experienced subsequently (i.e., that the animals were particularly 
eager to consume the first experimental food experienced in a day).  .  While this difference in 
consumption between first and second food experienced was not a critical one when testing 
anticipatory SSS, it was considered reasonable nevertheless to take advantage of the animals‟ 
initial eagerness to eat the first food presented, as in the case of critical trials this was the all-
important flavour test in the decision box.  Therefore all critical testing sessions occurred in the 
morning.  Chapter 3 also involved creating an association between pellet flavours and 
environmental contexts, for example, the rats learned through repeated exposure that peanut was 
always experienced while in the black apparatus, whereas banana was always experienced when 
in the light coloured enclosure.  Various tactile floor coverings (mesh, PVC, etc) made the 
contexts even more distinct. 
Chapter 4 investigated future planning.  The animals were trained to anticipate a return to a 
certain environmental context by moving them between the different contexts and the decision 
box in a simple, repetitive sequence, for example: empty context A, followed by the empty 
decision box, followed by a return to context A (and context A‟s associated flavour of pellet).  At 
test, the well-established sequence was interrupted with an unexpected flavour choice in the 
decision box, and prior to the animal‟s return to context and the context‟s associated flavour.  
The unexpected flavour choice consisted of the flavour associated with the upcoming context, 
and an alternative flavour.  This design assessed whether, when given an unexpected choice, the 
animals would choose to eat proportionally more of the incongruous flavour in the decision box, 
demonstrating a proclivity to preserve the pleasantness of the anticipated flavour on return to 
context. 
However this was not demonstrated.  The animals showed no such tendency to consume the 
incongruous over the congruous flavour, in fact there was no significant difference between the 
average proportion of the congruous and incongruous flavour consumed in the decision box.  
This does not demonstrate awareness of any upcoming satiation.  The animals‟ behaviour 
therefore did not demonstrate any examples of spontaneous future planning.  Following this 
result it was attempted to establish whether the animals could learn to solve the task if the 
flavour choice was presented daily, rather than infrequently as before.  This alteration meant that 
the animals had the frequently repeated experience of a flavour choice in the decision box 
followed by a return to context and the context‟s associated food.  This repetition allowed the 
animals to learn from the consequences of their choice in the decision box with respect to the 
subsequent pleasantness of consuming the anticipated flavour in context, i.e., it was thought that 
an animal that ate the incongruous flavour at decision would be subsequently „rewarded‟ on 
return to context with a flavour that was more pleasant to eat, and the animal then has the 
opportunity to attempt the same reward-inducing behaviour the following day.  Conversely, an 
animal that chooses the congruous flavour in the decision box would return to context to find the 
context flavour reduced in pleasantness due to the large amounts of this same flavour just 
consumed in the decision box.  As before however, the animal has the opportunity to correct this 
„mistake‟ the following next day by choosing to consume the incongruous over the congruous 
flavour in the decision box.  The current group of animals did not learn to consume a larger 
proportion of the incongruous flavour however, and instead over the course of the learning trials 
consumed a significantly larger proportion of the congruous flavour in the decision box. 
 
 
Consideration of similar studies 
The fact that the animals can neither perform the task spontaneously nor learn to solve it is 
enlightening as it demonstrates these animals do not appear capable of solving this task in any 
form – either in terms of genuine future planning based on a one-off occasion, something 
demonstrated by Correia et al‟s (2007) scrub jays, or learning to anticipate following repeated 
exposure.  This is interesting in terms of the future planning literature, as the latter, learning, 
stage of the study was similar to a study by Naqshbandi & Roberts (2006) in which monkeys and 
rats were offered a choice between a larger and a smaller pile of food.  Choosing the larger pile 
was considered to be ultimately the more presently rewarding, however choosing the smaller pile 
meant a water bottle was returned to the cage sooner than if the large pile was chosen.  The food 
made the animals thirsty, and after a number of repeated trials the monkeys were able to 
anticipate this upcoming thirst and switch their preference from the larger to the smaller pile of 
food.  The rats however never learned to switch their preference and continued choosing the 
larger pile of food regardless of the thirst that occurred every time.  Success in this experiment 
relies on the animals making a choice that could be regarded as negative for their current self, but 
advantageous for their future self.  This means the animals had to compare the benefits of the 
current choice (large pile of food) with the benefits of a future situation (swift return of water 
bottle preventing uncomfortable thirst). 
Success in the present study would not have required the animals to make a choice that was 
negative for their current self, as the two flavours offered were equally palatable to the animals, 
and so no such present-versus-future trade-off was necessary.  This potentially made the current 
task easier to solve than that of Naqshbandi & Roberts (2006), and yet still the rats were unable 
to learn it.  
Other studies have had similarly little success in demonstrating the learning of future planning 
over a number of trials in rats.  McKenzie, Bird & Roberts (2005) repeatedly allowed rats to 
freely cache small pieces of food in any of 8 arms of a radial maze.  Four of the arms were 
designated „degrade‟ locations, such that any food stored in those arms by the rats was rendered 
inedible by the time the animals came to retrieve their caches.  Any food stored in the „safe‟ half 
of the maze was still good to eat on retrieval.  This experiment was repeated many times, and yet 
the animals did not learn to preferentially store food in the „safe‟ arms of the maze, rather, the 
storage locations remained random.  Of note was the fact that when it came to retrieving their 
caches the rats only searched for food in the safe arms, demonstrating they understood the 
difference between the safe and degrade locations at retrieval, but were not capable of using this 
knowledge when storing.  It appears that they were not capable of associating storage with the 
future activity of retrieval, even after several repetitions. 
 
Taken together, the results of these studies and those of the current investigation suggest that rats 
are simply incapable of solving future orientated tasks, or indeed learning to do so.  However it 
should be noted that there are relatively few studies that have successfully tapped into an ability 
to behave in a way that is entirely future orientated.  For example Mulcahy & Call (2006) 
investigated future planning by assessing the abilities of chimpanzees to choose a tool that would 
enable them to extract grapes from a machine on a future occasion, however the apes were 
offered a choice of tool while within sight of the apparatus on which the tools would be used, 
therefore there was no guarantee that the animals were basing their choice on future rather than 
current drives to extract grapes.  This is similar to the studies of episodic memory that do not 
always make the necessary explicit distinction between action based on current drives or 
familiarity, and action based on genuine recall of a past experience, for example Schwartz, 
Hoffman & Evans (2005) tested King the gorilla‟s memory of exposure to certain foods or 
carers.  However the authors acknowledged that the regular testing sessions may have allowed 
King to „prepare‟ for his test by storing his experiences of foodstuffs or certain carers as 
something akin to semantic knowledge, ready to communicate at test as something that he 
simply „knows‟ rather than genuinely „remembers‟, in order to get a food reward.  Similarly, 
Eacott & Norman (2004) acknowledged that testing rats‟ memory for certain objects by 
assessing their behaviour towards these objects in an open field, allows the animals to use current 
feelings of familiarity versus novelty, rather than genuine memory, to solve the task.  The only 
demonstration as yet of true nonhuman future-orientated behaviour (spontaneous rather than 
learned in this case) appears to be Correia, Dickinson & Clayton‟s (2007) investigations, which 
also utilise the concept of anticipatory SSS.  What makes this study interesting is that the task 
required scrub jays to make a choice against their current motivations as in the Naqshbandi and 
Roberts study, rather than making a neutral choice, as in the present study.  Correia et al‟s (2007) 
scrub jays were exposed to a certain foodstuff (A) for 3 hours, resulting in complete satiation to 
that foodstuff.  The birds were then given a choice of this foodstuff (A) or an alternative (B) to 
cache, for retrieval later.  The birds were taught that the future retrieval of this cache would 
follow 3 hours of exposure to foodstuff B.   
Therefore initially caching foodstuff A would ensure that the pleasantness of the retrieved 
flavour remained high.  However this required the birds to cache foodstuff A while satiated by 
this flavour, which is behaviour against the birds‟ current satiation-based drive to select foodstuff 
B.  This group of jays were successful because the birds chose on average to cache more of 
foodstuff A despite being currently satiated by it.  This demonstrates an awareness that the 
current caching event was linked to the future retrieval event, a connection that McKenzie et al‟s 
(2005) rats were incapable of making, even following repeat trials.  This demonstration of 
apparently truly future orientated behaviour means the Correia et al (2007) study has come the 
closest to demonstrating nonhuman future planning.  It has been commented previously however 
(Eacott & Norman 2005) that it would be particularly useful to observe similar abilities in a 
species that does not so instinctively cache food for future retrieval, hence these authors‟ 
investigations into the abilities of rats.  It remains the case that no study has yet demonstrated the 
same future planning ability in rats, through truly future orientated behaviour.  There is the 
possibility of course that this and other species simply do not have this capability. 
 However, it should be remembered that there are several studies that have successfully 
demonstrate the episodic-like memory abilities of animals – the ability to behave in response to 
the genuine recall of a complete memory (Clayton, Bussey & Dickinson, 2003; Zentall, 2005), 
including rats (Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2003; Eacott, Easton & Zinkivskay, 2005).  This is 
interesting because much developmental evidence (Atance & O‟Neil, 2005; Suddendorf and 
Busby, 2005) as well as patient studies (Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002; Hassabis, Kumaran, 
Vann & Maguire, 2007) and neuroimaging studies (Botzung, Denkova & Manning, 2008) 
strongly suggest that episodic memory in humans is one half of an over-arching mental time 
travel system which also encompasses the ability of future thinking.  This „Mental Time Travel‟ 
system (Suddendorf & Busby, 1997) allows humans to consciously travel in either direction 
along their own personal timeline – i.e., to recall their past and imagine their future.  If episodic 
memory and future thinking do in fact rely on the same cognitive processes, then the 
demonstration of nonhuman episodic-like memory in any species (the ability to behave in 
response to genuine recall of the past) should mean this species is also capable of future planning 
(behaviour in response to a genuinely anticipated future).  Indeed, Tulving (1999, cited in Atance 
& O‟Neill, 2001) makes the point that the role of episodic memory (recalling the past) is largely 
to enable a creature to use this special kind of memory in order to plan for an uncertain future.  
For example, Tulving suggests that the ability to vividly recall an unpleasant past episode must 
have little use beyond ensuring that such an event does not happen again, and therefore there 
would be little advantage for an animal to possess the retrospective ability if it was not to be used 
in tandem with a prospective planning ability. 
 The results of the current study certainly suggest that rats are not capable of solving the current 
task, however the above cited evidence means it would almost be counterintuitive to assume that 
this group of rats would be incapable of any task requiring future planning.  Therefore it should 
be considered why the current study may have been unsuccessful, leaving aside for now the 
possibility that rats simply do not have this ability. 
 
Lack of success in the current study 
The current study was unsuccessful in demonstrating a future planning ability based on two 
results: Firstly, during the testing phase (in which the animals were presented with infrequent 
and unexpected flavour choices) the rats did not choose to consume proportionally more of the 
incongruous flavour, as would be expected of animals capable of anticipating satiation to a 
particular flavour in the near future.  There was no significant difference in the proportions of 
incongruous or congruous flavours consumed at this stage.  Secondly, in the learning phase (in 
which the animals were presented daily with a flavour choice) the rats did not learn to consume 
greater proportions of the incongruous flavour, even following these repeated trials.  In fact, over 
the course of the learning trials, the animals consumed a significantly higher proportion of the 
congruous flavour when in the decision box.  This demonstrates that the animals did appear to 
shift their eating behaviour from consuming equal proportions of the two flavours in the test 
trials, to the significant preference for the congruous flavour during the learning task.  While this 
does appear to demonstrate learning of a sort, it is learning to consume more of the incongruous 
flavour that would have suggested an ability to plan for upcoming satiation.  The current result 
shows that consuming, for example, peanut flavour in the decision box does not diminish the 
pleasantness of consuming yet more peanut flavour pellets on return to context.  Therefore the 
following questions should be considered: firstly, what possible reasons are there for the 
animals‟ inability to solve, or to learn to solve, the task, other than simply that rats are incapable 
of any kind of future planning.  And secondly, what reasons are there for the result obtained 
here: a greater proportion of the congruous flavour consumed during the learning phase, as this 
behaviour could be interpreted as somewhat counterproductive. 
In terms of the lack of success in the task, the study has made a number of assumptions that may 
not in fact be appropriate, and may offer an explanation as to the lack of success in this task.  
One such assumption relates to the associations between the contexts and flavours.  This study of 
anticipatory SSS relied on the animals associating certain contexts with certain flavours.  This 
association was attempted by only having the animals experience certain flavours in certain 
environmental contexts, for example, the animals only ever experienced chocolate flavour pellets 
when in context A.  This meant that an animal anticipating a return to context A (following the 
much repeated sequence of Context A > decision box > Context A) should also anticipate 
upcoming exposure to chocolate flavoured pellets.  It was on the assumption that context A was 
associated with chocolate that a flavour choice was offered in the decision box prior to the 
animal‟s return to this context.  However an animal that had made no such association would not 
anticipate chocolate flavour pellets and so would not be able to make a flavour choice in the 
decision box based on anticipatory SSS (even if the upcoming context was successfully 
expected).  Therefore the inconclusive result obtained here may have been the result of the 
animals not making these context-flavour associations.  However, the results from the later, 
learning phase of the study suggest that such an association was in place: during the learning 
phase, when the animals were offered a flavour choice in the decision box on a daily basis, the 
rats consumed on average more of the congruous than the incongruous flavour in the decision 
box.  While this does not demonstrate future planning abilities, it does suggest that the animals 
were choosing to eat the flavour associated with the context from which they had just come.  
This result is in line with the aforementioned findings by Petrovich, Ross, Gallagher & Holland 
(in press) that an association between a location and a particular kind of food causes an increase 
in the consumption of that food when in the location.  This congruous flavour preference was 
also not seen in the earlier testing trials, when the food choice in the decision box was only rarely 
presented.  It may be the case that frequent experience of a flavour choice (which included the 
flavour associated with the context just experienced) in some way cemented this association.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the animals began to anticipate the (now frequent) flavour choice 
before they were placed in the decision box, allowing them to make a choice „in advance‟ i.e., 
while still in the context associated with the congruous flavour, and therefore more likely to 
choose that flavour, as with the Petrovich result cited above.  Therefore the congruous flavour 
preference seen in the learning trial does not demonstrate that the animals can plan for the future, 
but it does suggest that the animals at least had associated the various environmental contexts 
with the intended flavours. 
Another assumption that was not sufficiently challenged in the present study was the animals‟ 
ability to genuinely predict the upcoming context.  Even if the contexts were successfully 
associated with flavours, an animal incapable of anticipating which context it would next 
experience would be incapable of expecting satiation to the context‟s associated flavour.  The 
learning results considered in the above paragraph do not suggest that the animals, when in the 
decision box, are anticipating being returned to context.  It was attempted to train the animals to 
successfully anticipate the upcoming context by repeatedly exposing them to a simple sequence 
of locations: placement in a particular context, followed by a short spell in the decision box, 
followed by a return to the original context (shown in fig 5.1). 
Fig 5.1 – sequence training the animals to anticipate the upcoming context, and upcoming satiety 
 
It is intuitive to assume that following extensive repetition of this simple sequence an animal 
would come to anticipate where it would be placed next, i.e., when in the decision box an animal 
should be capable of anticipating its return to the context it was in previously.  This assumption 
is based on anecdotal accounts, field observations and more controlled experiments within the 
laboratory that demonstrate nonhumans are sensitive to habits relating to time and place: Roberts 
(2002) cites the example of a dog that approaches its food dish at meal times, as well as field 
studies that observed oystercatcher birds appear on the mudflats at the point of lowest tide each 
day, both of which show anticipation born of frequently repeated behaviour (though it is 
acknowledged that these behaviours do not provide evidence for genuine forward thinking).  
Even more relevant, and under controlled lab conditions, Biebach, Gordijn & Krebs (1989) 
found that garden warbler birds learned which one of many feeding rooms contained food at 
different periods throughout the day, such that after learning the sequence they moved flawlessly 
between the rooms each hour in order to gather the food.  It is interesting to note that during the 
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present study, after 5 minutes in a particular enclosure, a rat would often move to the specific 
corner from which the experimenter consistently collected it.  All of the aforementioned suggest 
that a variety of nonhuman species are capable of learning time-place sequences.  It should of 
course be noted that the examples above involve learning based on habitual action on the part of 
the animal, rather than the passive movements of the current study.  
It was never conclusively demonstrated that an animal in the decision box was capable of 
anticipating the remainder of the sequence, and its return to context.  An animal that was 
unaware of its impending return to context A, for example, would have no anticipatory-based 
reason to consume the incongruous flavour in the decision box.  This may have contributed to 
the lack of any significant flavour preference at the testing stage.  The preference for the 
congruous flavour at the learning stage does not throw light on this issue, as this preference need 
not be based on anticipation of the upcoming context, rather the same result could occur from 
memory of the context just experienced, or simple priming. 
This uncertainly as to the animals‟ context anticipation is a drawback of the study.  A possible 
test for this, following many experiences of the above sequence, may have been to move the 
animal from the decision box to a context (and associated flavour) that was „out of sequence‟ and 
observe the animal to establish if this move out of sequence created more occurrences of 
novelty-seeking behaviours than a return to the „expected‟ context, such as increased exploration 
of the enclosure and food dish (containing the flavour associated with the relatively novel 
context), including standing on hind legs against the enclosure walls, sniffing all areas of the 
enclosure and increased overall distance walked within the enclosure.  These are behaviours that 
Eacott and Norman (2004) and Dix and Aggleton (1999) successfully recorded as an indication 
of an animal‟s awareness of changes to the environment, used by Eacott et al to demonstrate that 
rats are capable of noticing very slight alterations to an otherwise unchanged environment.  A 
lack of a formal test for this ability is a drawback of the present study, as it is possible that when 
in the decision box the animals were not aware of their imminent return to the appropriate 
context and thus were unaware of which flavour they were soon to experience. 
 
The third important assumption of the study was that any anticipation would for genuine 
satiation of the upcoming flavour, and not simply anticipation of „exposure‟ to the context and 
flavour combination.  The study intended to assess anticipatory SSS – the anticipation of a future 
state of satiation by a certain flavour, sufficiently salient to drive the animals to choose the 
alternative flavour if offered a flavour choice in advance.  The initial experiments of chapter 2 
were designed to establish the quantity of food and the timeframe required for the animals to 
become genuinely satiated, and this information was subsequently used in chapter 4 to train the 
animals to expect genuine satiation to a certain flavour: as shown previously in figure 5.1, an 
animal was returned to the appropriate context in which had been placed 2g of a certain flavour 
of pellet, to which the rat was exposed for 5 minutes.  According to the results in chapter 2 this 
was sufficient to result in satiation, however the results from chapter 4, discussed below, suggest 
these animals were not satiated under these conditions and thus could not be expected to 
anticipate this state of genuine satiation during the testing phase of the study.  It would only be 
anticipation of satiation by a certain flavour, rather than merely anticipation of the flavour itself, 
that would drive an animal to select the incongruous flavour in preparation. 
In chapter 4 it was demonstrated that the rats consumed greater amounts of food when returned 
to context following a congruous flavour choice in the decision box.  It may have been assumed 
than an animal eating a large amount of the congruous flavour in the decision box would become 
satiated by this flavour, rendering the same flavour less peasant to eat immediately afterwards on 
return to context, however this was not the case.  This suggests that by the later stages of the 
study, the suggested 2g of food used to satiate the animals to a particular flavour was no longer 
sufficient. 
Conversely, it was also the case that the animals ate significantly smaller amounts of food on 
return to context following an incongruous flavour choice in the decision box, which is 
somewhat counterintuitive: it would be assumed that an animal eating incongruously in the 
decision box would be doing so in order to ensure that subsequently eating the anticipated 
flavour in context would be a more pleasant experience.  However this did not appear to be the 
case.  This seems at odds with the positive SSS result in chapter 3, in which the animals ate 
significantly greater proportions of the incongruous flavour (that which they had not just 
experienced), which would suggest that the animals had been satiated by 2g of the initial flavour, 
however these findings are reconcilable.  In a successful demonstration of „normal‟ (as opposed 
to „anticipatory‟) SSS, the animals eat incongruously following exposure to a certain flavour, i.e., 
they must simply react to their current experience.  Even if not entirely satiated by the original 
flavour it is likely that a rat would still prefer to subsequently sample a relatively novel one if 
given the choice, in accordance with rats‟ intrinsic preference for novelty over familiarity - hence 
the positive SSS result.  However, anticipatory SSS is more complicated as it involves imagining 
future motivations rather than reacting to present ones.  The mere expectation of a certain flavour 
may not be sufficiently salient for an animal to choose the incongruous flavour in advance.  For 
this incongruous choice to occur, the animal may have to expect genuine satiation by a certain 
flavour, rather than expect simply the presence of that flavour.  In fact, it makes sense that 
expecting an upcoming flavour (but not expecting satiation to it) may result in the congruous 
choice being preferred in the decision box, due to this flavour being more salient at the time of 
decision.  
As discussed before however, these animals do not appear to become truly satiated by 2g of 
food, or across 5 minutes, particularly during the later parts of the study that investigate future 
planning.  This lack of satiation is obvious because an animal that consumes all 2g of the 
congruous flavour in the decision box does not subsequently appear to find the pleasantness of 
this flavour diminished on return to context, as would be the case if true satiation had occurred.  
This lack of satiation may be due to the increased size of the rats since the initial experiments to 
assess their satiety thresholds.  These assessments were carried out when the animals were 
between approximately 3 and 4 months old.  By the time the rats were tested at chapter 4 they 
were approximately 7 to 8 months old, hence the original food quantities and timeframes may 
have been insufficient by the time the rats reached this age.  The increased age of the animals 
should also be considered – Rolls & McDermott (1991) obtained the result that young rats 
demonstrated a much stronger result in favour of SSS than older rats.  Therefore an age-related 
decline in this tendency to seek relative sensory novelty may have hindered these animals in 
becoming satiated in the later parts of the study.  If the animals were in fact never satiated by the 
context flavour it would be impossible for them to anticipate it as a future state during the critical 
tests. 
It may be the case that genuine satiation can only be reached if the animals are previously food 
deprived to at least a certain extent, to facilitate increased consumption of a certain foodstuff or 
flavour.  Most studies investigating satiation (including those involving humans), e.g. Guinard & 
Brun (1998), Hetherington et al (1981), Rolls et al (1983), ensure that subjects are deprived of food 
for at least a few hours before test, as a genuinely hungry animal is more likely to eat a satiating 
amount of an experimental flavour when given the opportunity.  The current animals never 
experienced hunger however, due to their ad libertum access to food throughout the study.  Any 
further investigation of anticipatory SSS may wish to take this into account.  It is interesting to 
note that the study by Correia et al (2007) which does appear to demonstrate future planning in 
scrub jays by utilising anticipatory SSS, does not involve food deprivation.  However these birds 
were exposed to the appropriate satiating foodstuff for three hours prior to either caching or 
retrieval, which deprived the birds of all other kinds of food for a substantial period of time prior 
to test.  This ensured that if the birds were hungry they consumed only the intended foodstuff for 
3 hours, which resulted in the birds being completely satiated.  It is likely that the current rats 
were never entirely satiated by the experimental flavours.  
 
The above discussion offers two possible reasons for the animals‟ lack of success, namely the 
possibility that the animals did not learn the sequence of experimental contexts, and the 
possibility that the animals had not experienced genuine satiation and therefore could not be 
expected to anticipate it.  However the result from the final stage of chapter 4, the learning stage, 
is not entirely inconclusive.  As aforementioned, during the testing stage (during which the food 
choices were infrequent and unexpected) there was no significant difference between the 
proportions of congruous and incongruous food consumed at choice in the decision box.  At the 
learning stage however (when the flavour choices were presented daily) the animals consumed a 
significantly higher proportion of the congruous flavour.  It may be useful therefore to consider 
the differences between the two final parts of the study – the „test‟ and „learn‟ stages, in order to 
investigate why this preference for the congruous flavour developed.  The one main difference 
between the testing and learning stages was the frequency with which a food choice was 
presented in the decision box.  As aforementioned, a food choice was presented infrequently 
during the testing stage (most of the time during this testing stage the animals experienced an 
empty decision box), but daily during the learning stage.  The frequent food choices of the 
learning phase meant two things: firstly, the animals were able to frequently experience the 
consequences of the flavour choice they made, in terms of the subsequent pleasantness of the 
context flavour when they are returned to context.  This provided the opportunity to learn to 
anticipate the increased pleasantness of the context flavour following an incongruous flavour 
choice in the decision box.  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly in this case, the frequent 
flavour choice of the learning stage allowed the animals to come to expect that this choice would 
be presented, rather than the choice being unexpected as before.  If an animal anticipates (while 
still in context) an upcoming choice in the decision box, it is possible that the upcoming decision 
will be influenced by the context the animal was presently in.  This means the rats may have 
been responding according to the sort of conditioning that was seen in the experiments by the 
aforementioned Petrovich and colleagues (in press) - whereby an animal in an environment 
associated with a particular flavour is more likely to consume greater amounts of that flavour  
than when in an environment not associated with that flavour.  If the current group of animals 
were in some way aware of the upcoming flavour choice while still in context, this context 
location may have guided their flavour decision – indeed the rats‟ preference for the congruous 
flavour would suggest that this was the case, in line with the conditioning account mentioned 
above. 
 
It should be noted however that this possible awareness of an upcoming flavour choice during 
the learning trials is not the same as the ability to genuinely envisage the future and plan for it.  
The difference can be likened to that between episodic and semantic memory, with the former 
being genuine recall of a complete past event, and the latter a general awareness or knowledge, 
based on a previous experience that is not necessarily recalled.  The distinction is illustrated by 
the study of King the gorilla (Schwartz, Hoffman & Evans, 2005).  King was asked at a regular 
time at the end of each day to indicate using photographs the keeper that had attended to him 
earlier in the day, and the foodstuffs he had been provided with etc.  King‟s performance was 
very good, which may have suggested an ability to genuinely recall the events he relayed.  The 
authors concede however that the regular nature of the tests may have resulted in King storing 
the memories semantically - such that when he was tested, King simply „knew‟ the answers 
rather than having to genuinely recall the events that had occurred that morning.  Tapping into 
genuine episodic memory would have required the tests to be more sporadic, such that when 
asked, King would have to spontaneously actively recall what had happened to him previously.  
Similarly in the current experiment, an awareness of an upcoming flavour choice while the 
animals were still in context may mean that the flavour associated with this context is pre-
selected as the flavour to be consumed.  This could have created the preference for the congruous 
flavour seen in the learning, though not the testing, trials.  It is also possible of course that a 
simpler process was at work to produce the congruous preference seen in the learning trials: it is 
possible that the context to which the animals were first exposed simply acts as a primer, such 
that when placed in the decision box with a choice of flavours, the animals consume the one that 
is associated with the context they just experienced. 
 
Summary 
The current group of rats did not demonstrate future orientated behaviour, i.e., behaviour in 
response to future rather than current motivations.  The future motivation in question was 
satiation by an upcoming flavour.  The test for this was an unexpected flavour choice offered just 
before an animal was exposed to the anticipated flavour.  The flavour choice consisted of the 
flavour soon to be experienced (the congruous flavour) and an alternative (the incongruous 
flavour).  An animal capable of anticipating satiation to the upcoming flavour should 
preferentially consume the incongruous flavour at choice, so as to maintain the pleasantness of 
the upcoming flavour.  This would be consistent with the phenomenon of sensory specific 
satiety, whereby excessive consumption of one particularly flavour, smell, texture, etc. renders it 
subsequently less pleasant relative to other flavours, smells, textures, etc. (Rolls et al, 1981; 
1983; 1991, and many others).  However the animals‟ behaviour did not suggest an anticipation 
of upcoming satiety, because at choice the animals did not preferentially consume the 
incongruous over the congruous flavour.  In fact there was no significant difference between the 
proportions of congruous and incongruous flavours consumed.  The procedure was then altered 
in order to investigate if the animals were capable of learning to anticipate the upcoming 
satiation: instead of the flavour choice being offered unexpectedly, it was offered daily, such that 
the animals were able to learn from the flavour choices made in the decision box.  This time 
however the animals consumed significantly more of the congruous flavour at choice.  This 
suggested that the animals were not planning for a future state of satiation: an animal expecting 
to be satiated by a certain flavour in the near future would not eat that same flavour beforehand, 
as this would reduce the pleasantness of the upcoming flavour as consistent with the SSS 
literature.  It is possible that the animals were genuinely anticipating exposure to a certain 
flavour, but were not expecting to be satiated by it, and therefore were consuming the flavour 
congruous with their expectation.  However it is equally plausible that the animals were able to 
anticipate the now frequent choices and were therefore being influenced by the context they 
experienced prior to the decision box.  It is also possible that the animals were simply primed by 
the initial context to select the congruous flavour in the decision box. 
 
In conclusion the animals in the present study did not solve this future planning task, nor did the 
animals learn to solve the task following repeated exposure to it.  This is much the same result as 
obtained by Naqshbandi & Roberts (2006) who also used a repeated future planning task which 
produced a positive result in monkeys but not rats.  There has been no study to date that has 
satisfactorily demonstrated the ability of rats to act on anticipated future states, as distinct from 
those currently being experienced.  This may suggest that rats are simply incapable of this kind 
of future planning.  However there are several reasons why it may be prudent to avoid such 
conclusions as yet: firstly, as aforementioned, the current study is subject to flaws such as 
assumptions relating to the learning of context sequences, and satiation, therefore a study that 
challenged these assumptions or used an alternative task may produce a positive result here.  
Secondly, the Naqshbandi & Roberts (2006) study required the animals to switch their innate 
preference from a larger pile of food to a smaller one, i.e., to act against current drives.  While a 
successful result here would have been particularly compelling, it is not necessary for a future 
planning task to require action that could be considered currently counterproductive.  This 
requirement of the Naqshbandi & Roberts experiment may have resulted in the task being too 
difficult for rats, and a similar task that did not include this requirement may be met with more 
success.  Additionally, it should be noted that episodic-like memory has been demonstrated in 
rats (Eacott, Easton & Zinkivskay, 2005; Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2003; Babb & Crystal, 2005), 
and there is extensive literature that supports the notion of a single Mental Time Travel System 
encompassing both episodic memory and future thinking (Atance & O‟Neil, 2005; Suddendorf 
and Busby, 2005; Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 2007; 
Botzung, Denkova & Manning, 2008 and many others).  Therefore a species that has one such 
capability (episodic-like memory) should also have the other (forward planning).  Indeed, it is 
Tulving‟s (1999) view that the ability of an animal (human or nonhuman) to recall the past is 
useful only if it facilitates planning for the future.  If rats are capable of recalling past episodes 
then it is reasonable to consider that this species can also plan for the future, even if a task has 
yet to be developed that allows a satisfactory behavioural demonstration of the ability. 
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